University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Doctoral Dissertations

University of Connecticut Graduate School

5-6-2014

Adoption of Diffused Renewable Energy
Technologies: Patterns and Drivers of Residential
Photovoltaic (PV) Systems in Connecticut,
2005-2013
Marcello Graziano
University of Connecticut - Storrs, marcello.graziano@uconn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations
Recommended Citation
Graziano, Marcello, "Adoption of Diffused Renewable Energy Technologies: Patterns and Drivers of Residential Photovoltaic (PV)
Systems in Connecticut, 2005-2013" (2014). Doctoral Dissertations. 386.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/386

Adoption of Diffused Renewable Energy Technologies: Patterns and Drivers of Residential
Photovoltaic (PV) Systems in Connecticut, 2005-2013
Marcello Graziano, PhD
University of Connecticut, 2014

Growing concern about global climate change and energy security are prompting reconsideration
of how energy—particularly electricity—is generated, transmitted, and consumed in the United
States and across the globe. While an increasing amount of households are adopting solar power
across the developed world, the spatial and socioeconomic factors that shape whether or not
people adopt this technology is under-theorized (especially with regard to spatial drivers), and
not well researched from an empirical perspective. In my dissertation, I present a conceptual
model to describe and understand the socioeconomic and spatial factors affecting the diffusion of
PV systems. I build my model on the socio-technical tradition. Further, I present two empirical
studies where I combine statistical and mapping techniques aimed at finding the spatial patterns
and the underlying drivers influencing the adoption of PV systems in Connecticut since 2005. I
develop an innovative spatiotemporal band to control for spatial peer effects, while using several
socioeconomic and spatial variables to control for other factors. Contrary to previous literature, I
find that medium-sized centers represent the source of the diffusion, rather than larger, more
populous towns. Further, I find that spatial peer effects positively affect the adoption process,
while the lack of more refined and spatially conscious policies tend to make adoption more
difficult in densely populated areas. However, spatial peer effects tend to decrease in magnitude
as time and space increase. Finally, I find that current policies, which do not taking in to account
the differences in the socioeconomic and built environment among towns in Connecticut, fail to
reach potential adopters residing in multi-family buildings or in renter-occupied houses.
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Overview
Literature on the processes governing the diffusion of new goods and services is rich, both
theoretically and empirically. Nevertheless, we still do not have a comprehensive, simple and
temporal dynamic conceptual model describing the relationships linking the sources influencing
the diffusion of diffused renewable energy technologies (DRETs). Furthermore, our knowledge
of the interaction between spatial and socioeconomic drivers governing any diffusion process is
limited, having become only recently central in the discourse on the transition towards more
sustainable societies. In rooting my research within the socio-technical tradition, the work of
Hägerstrand, and the works on diffusion studies hosted within economics, particularly the one of
Bollinger and Gillingham (2012), I seek to expand our knowledge on how policies, space and
socioeconomic factors interact to either support or impede the diffusion of DRETs. In
operationalizing my model, I focus on a family of DRETs: residential rooftop photovoltaic
systems (PV systems). Literature has only recently began to research the underlying factors
driving the adoption of PV systems, as they become a more viable option to reduce our
dependence on fossil fuels. However, as rich as it is, literature on DRETs diffusion and PV
systems diffusion has yet to answer to the following questions:
1. How can we conceptualize the diffusion process of DRETs over space and time,
accounting for the continuous changes occurring the elements of the process themselves?
2. Can researchers operate this conceptual model within case studies? Specifically, is it
capable of describing the diffusion of PV systems?
3. Does the diffusion of PV systems follow a specific pattern across time and space? If so,
what are the elements driving this diffusion?
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4. How do policies regulating PV systems operate across space and time, as the geography
of the area changes over time? Specifically, how does the diffusion process change in
highly urbanized areas?
5. How do spatial peer effects affect the diffusion process?
6. Does time affect spatial peer effects?
Providing answers to these questions is the scope of my dissertation. Specifically, my research
objectives are:
1. To develop a dynamic conceptual model inclusive of all the major components affecting
the diffusion of DRETs over time and space;
2. To use the model as a guidance in the interpretation of two empirical studies on the
diffusion of PV systems in Connecticut;
3. To identify specific spatial patterns in the diffusion of PV systems over time;
4. To identify the role played by the frictions occurring between current policies and the
geography of the diffusion area of PV systems; and
5. To identify how spatial peer effects affect the diffusion of PV systems in Connecticut.
Answering to each of the questions above through the fulfillment of these objectives will provide
important insights for policymakers. Accounting for the different settings within which they
operate will make policies more effective and efficient. For instance, resources can be targeted
differently for densely populated areas where households reside in multi-family buildings. These
conclusions are mere speculations unless proven: this is the motif for developing this study under
the rules and requirements of academic research and integrity.
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To fulfill these objectives, I divide my dissertation in to three main chapters. In the first chapter,
I provide a careful review of the literature on diffusion, highlighting the fundamental theoretical
and empirical changes occurred since the 1950s. From this survey of the literature, I then
develop a conceptual model that aims to understand what are the elements involved in the
diffusion of DRETs. I root my model within the socio-technical tradition, particularly the work
of Geels (2002), although I expand the sources of diffusion of innovations and introduce the role
of both time and area geography as factors shaping the process itself, as suggested by
Hägerstrand (1952). In the second chapter, I present an empirical work seeking to identify and to
quantify the role of spatial peer effects and the area geography in the diffusion process of PV
systems. This first empirical work extracts some of the concepts outlined within the conceptual
framework, and in particular the interaction among adopters and the relationship between current
incentive policies and the geography of the jurisdiction where these policies are implemented.
Further, in my third chapter I present second empirical work on how variations in the relative
profile and built environment among urban areas can affect the diffusion of PV systems when
policies do not account for these variations. Finally, I provide a brief conclusion in which I link
my empirical findings to the conceptual model.

3

Conceptualizing the Transition towards Sustainability: Adopters,
Policies and Area Geography in the context of Time and Space.
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Section I: Introduction
Growing concern about global climate change and energy security are prompting reconsideration
of how energy—particularly electricity—is generated, transmitted, and consumed in the United
States and across the globe (Devine-Wright 2008; Pasqualetti 2011; Freitas, 2012). Many
jurisdictions have set ambitious renewable energy goals, targeting 20% of their electricity to be
generated by renewable sources by 2020 (e.g. the European Union, EU 2012). Targets can be
met using a variety of low-emission alternative energy projects at various technological scales.
While an increasing amount of households are adopting solar power across the developed world,
the factors that shape whether or not people adopt this technology is under-theorized (especially
with regard to spatial drivers), and not well researched from an empirical perspective. One aspect
of renewable energy technologies (RETs) that is particularly poorly understood is the way in
which this technology diffuses over space and time, and what factors influence adoption. When
studying innovations, the process of adopting the innovation itself is considered as important as
the material development of innovation, sometimes referred to as ‘invention’ (Hägerstrand,
1962; Brown, 1981). The process of adoption, in which people or institutions decide to acquire
the new good, finds its outcome in the diffusion of the innovation itself. The diffusion process is
influenced by many factors, including geographic characteristics and homophilic-related effects,
better known as peer-effects (Hägerstrand, 1967; Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012). Peer-effects
are occur when ‘the decision of others to adopt influences the utility an individual receives from
adopting’ (Gillingham and Sweeney, 2012, p.13). Potentially, peer-effects generate externalities
affecting the overall diffusion process, such as adoption even in the case of financial losses for
emulating other agents (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012). In the case of durable goods visible to
others. Spatially-related peer effects may occur, creating an involuntary effect on nearby
5

residents. Similarly, the geography of an area can affect the diffusion process (Hägerstrand,
1967; Geels, 2001). Many technologies are adopted and operated with a context of spatiallyuniform policies, which do not take in to account the nature of the specific technology and how
the built environment could affect the adoption decision (Bronin, 2012).
Researchers recognize the existence of two main families of renewables: centralized and diffused
(Gillingham and Sweeney 2012). The former, sometimes labeled as ‘large-scale’, resemble the
spatial organization of current fossil plants. Large, capital intensive and efficient plants are built
in selected locations and distribution is made possible through the construction of multi-modal
systems (e.g. power-lines). These systems are not the focus of the present research. Although
they similar barriers and drivers with diffused technologies, the key players involved and the
relationships among stakeholders in the case of large plants are different (Gillingham and
Sweeney, 2012). The second family of technologies, ‘diffused renewable energy technologies’
(DRETs)1 have captured the interest of those regions where distribution is costly or the coexistence of renewable power and fossil-fuel power is more difficult for technical reasons.2
Policymakers have considered DRETs as a way to diffuse renewable energies faster than largescale projects and at a lower price.3 Specifically, residential rooftop solar photovoltaic systems
(PV systems) have become more common in certain regions of the USA and of the world
(Guidolin and Mortarino, 2010). Between 2010 and 2011, residential photovoltaic systems have
by 24% in the USA, with increases in every state thanks to the continuous implementation of

1 With the acronym ‘DRETs’ I mean household-level, small scale renewable energy technologies. Example of these technologies are PV systems
below 100 kW of capacity, thermal solar installations, and micro-wind turbines.
As an example, consider the instability of power production from solar farm, as the overall production decreases at night or during winter. The
power lines would be subject to strong variations in the load that is delivered to the main grid, thus affecting the delivery of power to consumers.
3
The focus of my study is not to compare the two families of technologies: they are not mutually exclusive, and are usually adopted together in
order to suit local needs.
2
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Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS),4 local policies and improved information (Busche, 2010;
Sherwood, 2012; Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012).
A better understanding of the relative importance of various factors that influence adoption such
as socio-demographic characteristics, housing characteristics (e.g. tenancy) and socio-economic
characteristics is needed in order to inform policies intended to promote the adoption of
alternative energy. Despite being rich in studies dealing with diffusion and innovation processes
in general, literature has yet to explain the specific mechanisms involved in DRETs diffusion in
general and PV systems in particular.
I organize the remainder of the paper as follows: Section II we provide a thorough review of
relevant literature on DRETs, highlighting the disadvantages of current socio-technical models,
in particular those based on the work of Geels (2002) relative to DRETs. In Section III, we
present the elements and the structure of the conceptual model. In Section IV, we explores the
ways in which the elements of the model connect to each other and influence the diffusion
process of DRETs. Finally, in Section V, I highlight the advantages of the proposed model
compared to previous socio-technical models of diffusion.
Section II: Review of the Literature
Public institutions have long been using incentive schemes to promote the diffusion of RETs in
general and DRETs more specifically. These incentives are necessary due to the higher costs of
DRETs and RETs compared to fossil fuels (Gillingham and Sweeney, 2012; IEA, 2010). Even
when operated at lower costs than non-renewable sources, adopters of DRETs may require
additional financial incentives due to the initial capital costs for switching to the new energy
4

‘A renewable portfolio standard (RPS) is a regulatory mandate to increase production of energy from renewable sources such as wind, solar,
biomass and other alternatives to fossil and nuclear electric generation. It's also known as a renewable electricity standard’ (NREL, 2013).
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source (IEA, 2010; Gillingham and Sweeney, 2012). Even in presence of strong monetary
incentives, it is important for policymakers to understand what other drivers contribute to the
diffusion of DRETs. Recently, literature has shown mixed results on the effectiveness of
monetary incentives for DRETs, thus suggesting that other policies (e.g. programs providing
previous experiences) and factors related to the profile of residents influence the diffusion of
renewable energies (Carley, 2009; Doris and Gelman, 2011). Consequently, the relationship
between non-monetary policies, adopters and local/federal regulations and incentive schemes has
been recognized as important in explaining the differences in adoption among regions,
particularly in jurisprudential literature and economics (Busche, 2010; Bronin, 2012; Bollinger
and Gillingham, 2012).
The first section of the literature review surveys the major works that inform on DRETs and the
methodologies associated with DRETs diffusion. The second section is organized around the
major fields of research from which the works generate.
[Figure 1 About Here]
As shown in Figure 1, research on DRETs diffusion draws from four main research streams,
belonging to as many broader fields. Technology Diffusion Research (TD), research on
Environmental Values, Policy Design and Spatial Analysis. As DRETs are durable goods, their
adoption process follows the one of this category of goods (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012).
Usually, DRETs deliver energy at a price higher than non-DRETs, such as large-scale coal
plants, or wind farms (EIA, 2013). Consequently, and in absence of major concern on delivery
reliability, other factors influence the decision of adopting DRETs. Among others, researchers
found peer-effect, personal attitude/values and favorable subsidies (Bollinger and Gillingham,
2012; Tate et al., 2012).
8

In Figure 1, the yellow block represents the research on policy design. Rules, incentives and
barriers implemented by local and national authorities can influence the diffusion of DRETs
(Bronin, 2012). The cluster dealing with environmental policies is a natural focus for DRETs,
and includes regulations dealing with energy policies and those regulating the protection of the
environment. Finally, the red block represents the contributions brought by Spatial Analysis in
general and Behavioral Analysis in particular. Literature on behavioral analysis comes from
different disciplines, although its origins are deeply rooted in geography and the original work of
Hägerstrand (Johnston, 1997).
DRETs have some similarities with other technologies in their adoption patterns. DRETs are
usually durable goods and adopters usually incur in monetary expenses for adopting these goods.
Adopters would not incur these costs if they decided to maintain the current energy systems.
Finally, spillover effects from adopters influence the decision of other agents (Bollinger, and
Gillingham, 2012). Being durable goods, DRETs tend to be purchased few times, and their use
spans over many years. Consequently, the commitment faced by adopters is higher than in the
case of non-durable goods (Bass, 1969).
Additionally, DRETs can face similar opposition and barriers to non-DRETs technologies due to
public perception, policy design, NIMBY5 syndrome and lack of information about the impact
on landscape and the environment (Warren et al., 2005; Devine-Wright, 2007; Klick and Smith,
2010; Gillingham and Sweeney, 2012; Bronin, 2012). Adoption of DRETs is subject to the
influence of environmental values (Dietz et al., 2005). Values shape and are shaped by the sociogeographical framework of the area proper to the DRET under examination (Hägerstrand, 2002).
Consequently, the political framework, the economic profile and the geography of a location
5

Not-in-my-backyard.
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play a major role in defining specific DRETs diffusion (Hägerstrand, 2002; Verbeek and Slob,
2006; Gillingham and Sweeny, 2012; Verbruggen et al., 2010).6
II.1 Technology Diffusion and DRETs
Understanding the factors driving the diffusion of industrial processes, goods and behaviors is
important for policy makers and market agents for formulating policies and strategies. In a paper
published in 1952 on innovation waves, Hägerstrand was the first scholar to use mathematical
modeling applied to Technology Diffusion research (TD) (Hägerstrand, 1952; Brown, 1981 and
Johnston, 1997). Hägerstrand made many contributions to different fields of geography,
including behavioral geography and spatial analysis. The latter field drove the research in TD
until the beginning of the 1960s, when other disciplines started contributing to diffusion
processes in general, and on TD in particular (Davies, 1979). After his initial contribution on TD
analysis, Hägerstrand published a second body of work introducing the concept of timegeography (Hägerstrand, 1988 and 1993). This second work and the voluminous literature
produced in the last forty years on time and space differs considerably from the linear dimension
introduced by Bass (Sui, 2012). First, time-geography seeks to introduce time with an historical
component, that is, effects become endogenous as time passes (Hägerstrand, 1982; Sui, 2012).
Second, time plays an active role with and over space, thus ending to be provide one of the
contexts within which action (e.g. adoption) takes place, and becoming an endogenous factor in
the analytical process (Sui, 2012). Third, Hägerstrand’s work brought the focus back on both
individuals and their surrounding environment, with the latter being defined as any physical
object surrounding agents, including those expanding their virtual and social space, such as
communication devices (Sui, 2012; Ellegard, 1999). This dissertation focuses on spatial
6

I use the term ‘geographic setting’ as equivalent of ‘built environment’ as used in Van Geehuizen et al. (2012). For
a more specific definition, see the methodological section.
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proximity: spatial spillovers alone have been found to affect positively the adoption of DRETs
(Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012). Therefore, network peer effects are beyond the scope of the
present work.
The major breakthroughs introduced by Hägerstrand and the subsequent adaptations and
modifications, have created the basis upon which the study of TD has been developed in the last
forty years (Sui, 2012). In social sciences, including geography, the study of TD has followed
two pathways. The first focused on the adoption processes of single agents, usually households.
This branch has its seminal works in those of Hägerstrand (1952), Rogers (1962) and Bass
(1969). The second branch of study deals with TD within and among industrial organizations,
and usually belongs to literature in economics and managerial sciences (Davies, 1979).
Households’ response to policies and market signals is the perspective followed by scholars to
depict TD of DRETs (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012). More recently, the study on the diffusion
of DRETs has developed along with that of environmental and socio-technical approaches:
scholars have been focusing more on the policy aspect of DRETs, and their public perception
(Verbeek and Slob, 2006).
II.2 Policy Design and DRETs
Policies can either accelerate or slow down the diffusion of DRETs (Painuly et al., 2001;
Verbruggen et al., 2010; Gillingham and Sweeny, 2012). Verbruggen et al. (2010) argued that
policies affect directly DRETs costs, prices, and technology innovation. Further, policies are the
original source of all man-made barriers, thus affecting the final potential of DRETs.7
Previously, Painluy identified seven major categories of barriers affecting the diffusion of both
RETs and DRETs. These families of barriers are ‘Market failures’, ‘Market Distortions’,
7

For the specific definition of ‘potential’, see Verbruggen et al. (2010).
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‘Economic and Financial’, ‘Institutional’, ‘Technical’, ‘Social, Cultural and Behavioral’ and
‘Other Barriers’ (Painluy, 2001). With the exception of few elements listed under ‘Technical’, all
other barriers relate to or can become through policy design. Even in the case of those barriers
grouped under ‘Social, Cultural and Behavioral’ education and information through public
institutions can increase the acceptance towards RETs and DRETs. One important element
emerging from Painluy’s work is the fact that these barriers are location-dependent. The author
stated:
‘However, several barriers, which may vary across countries, impede the penetration of RETs.
The barriers need to be identified and overcome before this potential can be realized (sic)’.
[Painluy, 2001, p.88].
My research will draw from the work of Bronin (2012). In her work, the author argued that
policies influence the adoption of DRETs in two stages. First, policies influence the adoption of
DRETs before agents purchase them, for example by guaranteeing subsidies or imposing local
fees. Second, policies influence the adoption of DRETs by regulating the way in which they can
operate (Bronin, 2012). Other authors have worked on siting and operating DRETs looking at the
regulatory context (see for example Outka, 2010 and 2011; Rule, 2010). This stream of research
parallels the one on environmental values in that it recognizes that disputes over DRETs emerge
between users and neighbors (Rule, 2010). Thus, perception and acceptance of DRETs is as
important as the policies regulating their adoption, in that the former can prevent the emergence
of conflicts between adopters and non-adopters. Recent studies have attempted to profile the
potential users of environmentally responsible technologies (e.g. Gunther et al., 2012). Although
literature is not rich in studies on DRETs diffusion, researchers have been working on electric
vehicles and mobility-related technologies (Hjorthol, 2013). This stream of research links
diffusion of DRETs, TD analysis and studies on environmental values, by focusing on
12

understanding how perception and beliefs influence people’s willingness to adopt electric
vehicles. Mathisen et al. (2012) interviewed and surveyed companies to get responses on how
electric vehicles (EV) were perceived by businesspersons. The authors found that the negative
elements were associated with technical problems such as functionality in winter. Rodseth
(2009) found that differences among social groups might provide valuable insight over the
diffusion of EVs. The author found that one of the major factors affecting the decision to
purchase an EV is the perception that they are environmental friendly, and this characteristic was
considered more important than higher purchase costs compared to oil-fueled car.
II.3 Environmental Values and DRETs
Scholars have integrated DRETs diffusion within the broader research of pro-environmental
behaviors and policies (Hägerstrand, 2002; Elzen, 2006; Laws; Verbeek and Slob, 2006b).
Verbeek and Slob placed this work at the intersection of policy and research ‘socio-technical’
studies (Verbeek ad Slob, 2006). The terms indicates the importance of sociological and
economic characteristics of each area of analysis combined with the character of the RET
analyzed. This set of approaches requires deriving multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary
perspectives integrating different disciplines across them (Gibbons, et al., 1994). The work of
Dietz et al. (2005) offers a well-documented overview of the advancements made in the
literature on environmental values. This strand of literature on environmental values is central to
any investigation of residential DRETs such as solar photovoltaic systems because the adoption
decision is a change of the current status quo and includes a capital spending decision (Becker et
al., 1981).
Researchers have started recognizing how people’s perceptions of DRETs affect their diffusion.
Sovacool (2009) argued that there is a disconnect between how electricity is produced and how it
13

is socially perceived. This disconnect was made possible through the centralized and remote
generation of power, cheap access to electricity and the role of psychological resistance. This
resistance is due to a strong preference for the status quo and the role of ‘comfort’ (Becker et al.,
1981). All these factors play a major role through the decentralization of power-generating
technologies and the ‘intrusion’ of DRETs into people’s sight. Pasqualetti first introduced the
concept of intrusion relative to landscapes and DRETs (Pasqualetti, 2000). In his work, the
author argued that the remoteness of most of generating technologies have hidden the true cost of
electricity generation, creating a sense of intolerance towards generating technologies once these
re-enter citizens’ landscapes (Pasqualetti, 2000). Gee found empirical evidence of the
relationships between landscape and perception of offshore wind power projects in the North Sea
(Gee, 2010). Warren et al. (2005) have found that knowledge of DRETs significantly reduces the
negative perception of wind power turbines. Literature is rich in case studies on wind power and
its perception, possibly because of the strong opposition by many groups despite its wellrecognized advantages (Klick and Smith, 2010). Firestone and Kempton (2007) found that the
perception of DRETs and the relation with the status quo depends on the demographic and
socioeconomic profile of respondents. In their work, the authors found that opposition to a wind
power project off the shores of Cape Cod, MA (USA) came mostly from wealthy, older
residents. The respondents were concerned more about the changes occurring on the seascape
rather than the advantages of wind turbines in terms of emissions reduction. Residential
photovoltaic systems may face a lower degree of opposition due to their small-scale nature.
Nevertheless, issues remain in defining solar rights (Bronin, 2009).
As mentioned in the previous section, there is a lack of literature profiling the potential adopters
of DRETs. Nevertheless, research dealing with electric vehicles offers insights into the profile of
14

those who adopt environmentally friendly technologies. Scholars have found that psychological
drivers may inhibit the adoption of electric vehicles, even when socioeconomic characteristics
would support the adoption (Franke et al., 2012). Strategies such as information, training and
education can counter these effects. These findings are consistent with those on wind power by
Warren et al. (2005), thus creating a theoretical bridge among environmentally conscious
technologies.
II.4 Spatial Analysis and DRETs
The original Bass diffusion model incorporated time and agent-specific characteristics,
particularly in its later articulations (Bass, 1969). In his model, Bass tested the idea that durable
goods are adopted in stages, with early adopters (‘innovators’) driving the passage from one
technology to the other. The idea of stages and the role of early adopters was present in Rogers
(1964). However, Bass provided both an empirical test of the stages.
Starting the 1980s, various authors conjugated spatial analysis, behavioral sciences and TD.
Authors have focused on creating sophisticated concepts of time and space (Brown, 1981;
Hägerstrand, 2002; Verbeek and Slob, 2006b).Time became ‘history’, meaning that agents have
memories and technologies are not introduced in to a vacuum. Place and scale have become
endogenous characteristic of the diffusion process. Models tried to look at the reasons behind
certain distribution phenomena. While the first TD models were descriptive, later models have
tried to discern the drivers behind certain diffusion patterns (Brezet, 2006 and Verbeek and Slob,
2006).
The socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of agents and those of the agents’
surroundings are the focus of many studies in DRETs diffusion. Agents act like other ‘peers’ for
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two main reasons: for emulating someone perceived as guidance; or for reducing the risk
associated in being an innovator (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012). Studies on TD in general
have described the relationships between innovators and followers: Hägerstrand included
information and emulation in his original work (Hägerstrand, 1967). Subsequent research
developed in marketing sciences and economics has tested the role of social interactions and selfselection of reference groups (Manski, 1993; Soetevent, 2006).8 For instance, Manski found that:
Inference is difficult to impossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are
statistically independent. The prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and
those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population. (Manski, 1993, p.1)

With the development of new sources of data and behavioral models, the problems stated by
Manski have been solved (Soetevent, 2006). Soetevent provided a review of the recent
development to account for neighborhood effects and peer-effect. In his work, the author argued
that:
‘Most reference group definitions put forward by empirical researchers are ad hoc and based on
• Social proximity
• Geographical proximity.’ (Soetevent, 2006 p.220 )
Bollinger and Gillingham found that a peer effect exists for solar photovoltaic in California
(Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012). The authors used econometric models to estimate the spatial
peer-effect in the case of PV systems in California, finding:
‘[…] strong evidence for causal peer effects, indicating that an extra installation in a zip code
increases the probability of an adoption in the zip code by 0.78 percentage points when
evaluated at the average number of owner-occupied homes in a zip code. (Bollinger and
Gillingham, 2012, p. 23)

8

The definition of peer-effect used in my research is the one adopted by Bollinger and Gillingham (2012).
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The findings of Bollinger and Gillingham shed light over the role of spatial peer-effect of
DRETs and in general and PV systems in particular. The physical presence of the panels creates
a sense of security, reducing the perceived risk for potential adopters and showing the change
from the business-as-usual is possible. Other authors investigated the same effect in the UK;
their results show stronger adoption in regions where agents first adopted photovoltaic systems
and a concentric pattern, with lower adoption in the further areas (Snape and Rynikiewicz,
2012). The two authors partly used the same assumptions used by Bollinger and Gillingham in
their 20112 study, although focusing on the spatial patterns, rather than using econometric
techniques. MacEachren and Hanson (2008) identified three major streams of research in
diffusion of technology: demand-focused, place-focused and a combination of the two, which is
the one they used. The authors provided an interesting perspective in their work because they
combined fieldwork and econometric models to study the adoption of PV systems in Sri Lanka.
The authors analyzed how the socio-geographic context of villages influences the adoption
decision, finding that social characteristics of villages influence the adoption patterns. The two
scholars used linear regression models to estimate the weight of the socio-geographic drivers on
the diffusion of PV systems due to the difficulty of collecting multi-year data. Through their
study, the two authors managed to find empirical evidence supporting Brown’s contentions that
the diffusion of technologies is affected by market and infrastructural elements (Brown, 1981;
MacEachren and Hanson, 2008). In addition, they found that informal relationship between
villagers and between villagers and politicians affected the diffusion of solar home systems.
Those villagers outside the social milieu tend to adopt faster, as they do not rely as much on
social consensus and neither trust politicians, especially if the adopters belong to other
ethnicities. One of the strength of their work is the inclusion of variables related to the area they
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studied that made the predictors interesting for any policymaker interested in similar contexts. La
Gennusa et al. (2011) and Theodoridou et al. (2012) looked at the characteristics of the cities. La
Gennusa et al. employed a GIS-based approach to estimate the potential of power production
from PV systems in an urban environment, specifically within inner cities. These approaches are
certainly useful in that they spatially identify areas where DRETs could be installed.
Nevertheless, their limits are evident: the authors focused purely on technical aspect and spatial
aspects, excluding any consideration related to the political, cultural or socioeconomic
landscapes in which these technologies were supposed to operate. Theodoridou et al. (2012)
followed a similar approach: the authors assessed the profitability and energy potential of
retrofitting building in densely populated urban areas. They concluded that:
“Conclusively, the general outcome obtained by current research, indicate that denser urban
areas perform limited potential both for retrofitting interventions on buildings’ envelope and
solar systems applications, apart from the quality and the age of building constructions”.
(Theodoridou et al., 2012, p. 6239).

Related to the work Theodoridou et al. (2012), Van Geenhiuzen et al. (2012) tried to find the
best PV systems for urban areas. Specifically, the authors analyzed the various solar technologies
for residential use, trying to find the best technology to expand the diffusion of PV systems in
urban areas. The authors argued that incentives for specific PV systems design and technologies
might be a solution for insuring that the most efficient and cheapest technologies are adopted in
urban contexts. Maes and Van Passel (2012) studied how policies can affect the efficient
diffusion of DRETs solar systems in the region of Flanders (Belgium) and the Netherlands,
comparing how policies and uncertainty affect the diffusion of hybrid and cogeneration energy
systems.9 The authors found that uncertainty reduces the diffusion of DRETs: because of its

9

Cogeneration systems produce electricity and heat simultaneously, thus increasing the overall efficiency of the system itself.
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widespread use in greenhouses in the Netherlands, cogeneration reacts better when uncertainty is
introduced, thus providing a better financial performance. Finally, the two authors found that
public policies greatly influence whether a specific DRET diffuse over others or even over RETs
in general. For instance, in the case of the Belgian region, the “[…] strong support [by public
authorities] might put other energy technologies in a less favourable position on the market. The
support for cogeneration units in Flanders is so large, that solar panels are no longer interesting
for the investor”. (Maes and Van Passel, 2012 p.680). Given solar panels reduce CO2 emissions
more cheaply than cogeneration systems. The authors concluded that:
“The future evolution of public policy should take the current disequilibrium into account”
(Maes and Van Passel, 2012 p.680).

This conclusion highlights the importance of integrating institutions and policies in the study of
DRETs diffusion: PV systems are found to be more convenient in the Flanders when compared
to cogeneration, but, still, public policies made possible for cogeneration to spread faster. The
authors did not detail the reasons behind the support towards cogeneration. It may have to do
with reasons associated with local preferences, expertise, need of a specific sector, etc. These
reasons, too, should be taken in to account before suggesting redirecting subsidies from one
DRET to another.
Studying the barriers/drivers to the diffusion of DRETs is a need recognized at national level by
the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE). The DoE has recently promoted a new initiative to study
the diffusion and evolution of solar energy (DoE, 2012). The request for proposals of the DoE
indicates that further research is required, and spatial models can play a major role in
understanding solar energy adoption patterns.
II.5 An Historic Perspective of Literature on DRETs Diffusion
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Literature on diffusion of innovations has multiple roots, spanning from the first third of the
Twentieth century with the work of Sauer (Brown, 1981) to the latest development in recent
years across a variety of disciplines. The first major theoretical and empirical work on diffusion
research can be traced back to the works of Hägerstrand (1952, 1967), although this author drew
from previous works by Sauer and others (Brown, 1981). In his work, Hägerstrand focused on
the demand side to explain the diffusion of innovations, from the agent perspective, trying to
understand the drivers behind the diffusion process. In particular, he focused on the role of
‘information’ as the way through which innovations diffuse. Consequently, Hägerstrand
integrated the role of the geography affecting information with the diffusion of innovations
(Webber, 2006). Aside from the specific methodological contributions and findings,
Hägerstrand’s work is crucial as it brings together various approaches; the author understood that
a single perspective was simply not enough to explain the diffusion process of innovations.
Consequently, the Swedish author first gathered data on the diffusion over time of several
durable goods, labeled ‘indicators’. He divided these indicators of innovation in to two
categories:
1. Agricultural indicators:
a. State subsidized pastures;
b. Control bovine tuberculosis; and
c. Soil mapping

2. General indicators:
a. Postal checking services;
b. The automobile; and
c. The telephone.
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The first set of indicators comprised only goods and services proper of farmers. The second set
comprised goods that could be found among the entire population. Along these indicators, for
which the author had consistent datasets across time and space was possible, Hägerstrand
included ‘complementary indicators’, similarly grouped in the two categories ‘agriculture’ and
‘general’.10 These goods served as control, and were though to either be adopter prior or
necessarily after the adoption of the two sets of indicators listed above.
[Figure 2 About Here]

Subsequently, he prepared the population maps representing the demography for the study area
(Southern Östergötland, in Sweden). This step, which occupies a significant of the book edited
by Pred in 1967 may look obvious today, as digital maps are commonly available, particularly
for population data. However, at the time, this was a fundamental step towards the development
of the model, and a great research effort because no such maps existed. Then, the author adopted
Markov-Chain Monte Carlo analysis is order to test the diffusion results over time, creating 3
models to test whether the diffusion of innovations take place as a decision of individuals or it is,
in reality, a more complex and group-based, information-driven process. In his first model,
Hägerstrand assumed that the diffusion of innovations was completely based on people’s choice,
and hypothesized that the individual characteristics would predict the process. This model
proved to be far from reality, as the control tests showed. In his second model, the author
assumed that information could spread from people in all directions from a central point. The
areas around these central points retain higher adoption rates as time passes. This second model
proved superior when compared with reality, although discontinuity appeared as time elapsed. In

10

These elements are tractor, automatic binder, milking machine, horse-drawn hoe, plumbing in barn, and plumbing
in farmer’s residence (agricultural). Household plumbing, refrigerator and the electric range (general).
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his third model, Hägerstrand introduced the concept of ‘Resistance to the fictional innovation’,11
defined as “The sum of direct contacts concerning the innovation made with already accepting
individuals prior to P’s own acceptance” (Hägerstrand, 1967, p. 265). Where P is the accepting
entity. The concept of barriers to diffusion and the introduction of information as part of the
diffusion process was not new at the time. However, as Pred said in the postscript to the
American edition of Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process, the novelty of Hägerstrand
resides in the “ […] Weightiest ramifications of the models ultimately derive from their
combination of random and non-random elements” (Hägerstrand, 1967, p. 307). The method, the
meticulous modeling, the testing and the inference of the results in light of the assumptions used
was the greatest contribution of the Swedish scholar through his first works. These contributions
distinguished Hägerstrand from previous authors such as Sauer, or those listed in the wellconceived review by Rogers (1962) in that simplified models were developed to deepen the
knowledge of complex problems.
The rich literature on the topic that has emerged after the end of WWII requires some form of
organization. I identify three major streams of research developed during the Twentieth century.
The first stream started at the end of 1960s, finding its major work in the Bass’ model (Bass,
1969). With his model, Bass attempted to forecast the diffusion of adoption of durable goods
focusing on the demand side once again, although giving more weight on the data portion of the
analysis. Later models, particularly in economics and marketing, adopted different mathematical
approaches to model the diffusion of innovations from the perspective of organizations,
individuals and the role of entrepreneurs/innovators (Davis, 1979; Brown, 2006). During the
same years, another stream of literature was developing, this time closer to geography. The
major work of this period is Diffusion of Innovations by Brown (Brown, 1981; Webber, 2006;
11

The term ‘fictional’ here refers to the innovation in the stylized model developed by Hagerstrand.
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Lutz, 2006). Brown built upon the ideas of Hägerstrand, expanding the concepts involved in
understanding the process of diffusion. In particular, Brown added three major factors (Webber,
2006):
1. The supply side of innovations plays a major role in the diffusion process;
2. The role of agencies in helping the diffusion process;
3. The impacts that the innovations have on the area where they take place.
Brown admitted the role of factors, capable of reducing or encouraging the diffusion process
(e.g. policies). For example, in the case of Hägerstrand’s study on the diffusion of selected
agricultural machineries in Southern Sweden, a post-1981 researcher would look at the role that
various local and state agencies played in encouraging the diffusion of these technologies across
time, including the how financing took place. In the field of DRETs, this advancement is
important because incentives and requirements are fundamental in supporting the adoption of
renewable technologies (Gillingham and Sweeney, 2012). Further, these same agencies can play
an important role in spreading the information, thus forming the demand side studied by
Hägerstrand. The third factor introduced by Brown adds the role of time more vigorously,
creating a connection between how innovations spread and how they interact with future
innovations and development (Webber, 2006). From the work of Brown, I identify an additional
barrier towards DRETs diffusion, which includes by the later works of Hägerstrand and in
particular his efforts to include the role of the environment in influencing people’s choices
(Hägerstrand, 1993).
I identified an additional tradition, whose roots can be found in the work of Rogers (1962). I
labeled this tradition as ‘sociological’ not because purely influencing sociology but, rather,
because of methodological approach focused on the theoretical aspects of defining and ordering
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the concepts and the elements of the diffusion process. In time, this tradition has merged with the
one formed upon the works of Hägerstrand and Brown, providing concepts and definitions used
by social scientists to communicate and frame empirical findings.
The section of Figure 2 below the dotted line represent a close-up on the more relevant streams
of research related to DRETs diffusion. The dotted arrows and the lines highlight the “jump”
forward in time and the shrink in focus. I intentionally left out several major contributions (e.g.
Hudson, 1969) in order to provide a better understanding of the more recent contribution in
DRETs diffusion, rather than on diffusion in general.
In recent years, I identified two major streams of research dealing with DRETs diffusion process.
Both these streams draw from the literature concepts, models and ways of inferring results.
However, they differ in the focus of their approach. The first of these two approaches is ‘SocioEconomic Models’ (SEMs). These models are direct heirs of the tradition established in
economics and marketing, and employ massive quantitative analysis, usually rooted in
econometrics. Examples of these works are Rodseth (2009), Guidolin and Mortarino (2010),
Pierre et al. (2011), Bollinger and Gillingham (2012), Snape and Rynickiewicz (2012), Freitas et
al. (2012), and Tate et al. (2012). Conceptually, these valuable works have the intrinsic limit of
focusing on either the supply or the demand side to explain the diffusion of DRETs. Even when
the variables employed cover both sides, the overall understanding of the relationship among
agencies/supply and demand is not considered. Nevertheless, this stream of research provides
models about specific relationships among the diffusion subjects (e.g. spatial peer effects).
The other stream of literature has a wider breath: it includes analyses aimed at developing
policies dealing with sustainability as a whole (Verbeek and Slob, 2006b; 2006). The difference
from the last black block in Figure 1 is not in the methodologies used: in fact, some of these
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studies employ quantitative tools and surveys (e.g. Firestone and Kempton, 2007; MacEacheran
and Hanson, 2008; Gee, 2010; Donovan and Nunez, 2012). Rather, the two blocks differ in terms
of perspective, for the literature descending directly from the economics/marketing tradition aims
at exploring the specific drivers leading to adoption of DRETs, whereas the other stream of
research aims at a more complete understanding of the causes of these drivers (Geels 2002;
Verbeek and Slob, 2006).
Section III: Elements of the Conceptual model
The conceptual model12 described in the following sections comprises three main elements:
1. The Area Geography (AG);
2. The institutional Framework (IF); and
3. The Adopting Agents (AA).
[Figure 3 About Here]

Figure 3 shows the overall model concept. Each elements within the model is explained in detail
in this section. Overall, the three main elements in the model are nested and arranged in a loose
hierarchy, based on the spatial width of each of them. The hierarchy is loose, as the IF can be
larger than the AG: however, the AG will still provide the physical limits for the total energy
available. The AG is filled to highlight the pervasiveness of its nature. There is a file rouge
connecting all the elements: this is the sum of the relationships occurring between each pair of
the elements.13 These relationships are bi-directional, meaning that each elements affects and is
affected by the others. The diffusion of a DRET takes place within this context: it reacts to the

12
13

For clarity’s sake, I will refer to it as ‘model’.
AG-IF; AG-AAs; IF-AAs; AAs-AG; IF-AG; AAs-IF.
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changes and the set of pressures and frictions occurring along the borders of each of the
elements.
I identify each of the components as a ‘subject’ of the diffusion process of DRETs. The term
highlights the centrality of these three elements in defining and influencing the diffusion process.
These three elements are not just places in which the diffusion of DRETs takes place. As
subjects, they influence and are influenced by the diffusion of DRETs. These elements are active
receiver and shaper of the process as a whole. Although using different labels and names,
literature has recognized the role of each of these subjects separately. For instance, Verbruggen
et al. (2010) and Maes and Van Passel (2012) recognized and explored the role of public
organizations in the diffusion process of solar energy. Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) and Gee
(2010) looked at how agents influence the adoption process itself, although from different
perspectives. Although indirectly, Hägerstrand (1993) described the role of the environment,
here AG, in influencing people’s attitudes and culture, which, in turn, influence agents’ behavior
(Dietz et al., 2005). Within each of the subjects, there are interconnected elements, arranged in
networks and interacting with each other, as described by Geels (2002). The strong hierarchical
character of Geels’ work fails to take into account changes deriving from institutions, the human
and the natural environment, and time.
III.1 Area Geography
Definition: ‘The mise en scene of fabricated and natural elements within the study area’.
Examples: Area geology, area morphology, area parcelization, districting, building set-ups,
logistic set-up (e.g. roads).

I label the first subject of my model ‘Area Geography’ (AG). So far, the term ‘diffusion’ has
appeared many times. The use of a spatial concept implies that the process itself has to take place
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within a space, which is both physical and institutional (Buttimer, 2001; Geels, 2002). Previous
literature has included this concept in different ways, almost following the two questions posed
by Hägerstrand in his works dealing with the role of people and the environment in Regional
Sciences (Hägerstrand, 1993). One major stream regards AG purely as a physical concept,
focusing on the interaction between humans and the natural environment (Hägerstrand, 1993;
Johnston, 1997). Other authors included both the natural and human environment under terms
such as landscape, socio-technical landscape or alike (Hägerstrand, 1993; Rip and Kemp, 1998;
Geels, 2002). Geels provides a clear definition of socio-technical landscape:
‘[…] a set of deep structural trends. The metaphor ‘landscape’ is chosen because of the literal
connotation of relative ‘hardness’ and the material context of society […]’ (Geels, 2002,
p.1260).
The character of ‘hardness’ mentioned by Geels is present in geography and diffusion studies
since their very beginning, particularly in the works of Hägerstrand and Sauer (Brown, 1981;
Johnston, 1997). The difference between these two visions lays in the relationship between
agents, usually humans, and the AG and the conceptual width of AG. Socio-technical scholars
tend to place the AG hierarchically higher, as depicted in Figure 4.

[Figure 4 About Here]

The hierarchy of the picture is in terms of macro-meso-micro levels, the macro level being the
hardest/slowest to change. In Hägerstrand’s work, the landscape is more directly associated with
human’s actions, and is one of the components in the author’s dioramas (Hägerstrand, 1988; Sui,
2004). Further, the model depicted above confines agents and the relationships between them
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and the IF at the meso-level (‘patchwork of regimes’), with niches left to be the engine of
innovation.
I define the Area Geography as ‘The mise en scene of fabricated and natural elements within the
study area’. The definition retains the character of ‘hardness’ common to both Hägerstrand and
Geels. Additionally, the use of the term ‘mise en scene’ is important because it implies that the
natural and fabricated components of the AG are arranged by the IF and/or the AAs. The
immateriality of the AG arises when it is perceived, rather than from its mere existence. In itself,
the AG provides AAs and the IF with possibly the only true limit: the total amount of energy
when efficiency is 100%. When dealing with multiple DRETs, this limit is overcome using new
technologies and fuels. For PV systems, the current efficiency is not nearly close to 100%, and,
consequently, increases in efficiency are still possible (Goodrich et al., 2012).
The term ‘Area’ indicates the geography of the location where diffusion takes place. Far from
making diffusion a ‘regionalist’ field of study, this term highlights the importance of scale and
location (Buttimer, 2001). However, these two factors can be changed in their size and focus,
and uniqueness of areas is not implied. It is beyond the scope of this work to explore the
implications of scale and location in natural resource and energy studies. I will defer to the
importance of area specification to the work of Hägerstrand and Brown. Both these authors
recognized that diffusion as a spatial process takes place somewhere, and that specific
somewhere influences the process itself. Nevertheless, neither of these two authors implied
regionalism in its classic meaning (Hägerstrand, 1967; Brown, 1981; Johnston, 1997).
III.2 Institutional Framework
Definition: ‘The ensemble of private and public organizations, including local, national and
international governing bodies and financial institutions’.
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Examples: Energy investment institutions, utility companies, national governments.

Nelson and Winters were the first to introduce the concept of ‘technological regimes’ as ‘the
outcome of organizational and cognitive routines’ (Nelson and Winters, 1982; Geels, 2002,
p.1259). With the expansion of the concept by Rip and Kemp, the routines have become rules,
and the participants in the process have expanded (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2002). Figure 5
shows the meso-level in Geels conceptual framework embracing the definition provided by Rip
and Kemp.
[Figure 5 About Here]
The multi-actor network depicted by Geels hosts some the elements forming the IF, for Public
authorities, research networks and institutions, and financial networks are the elements of this
subject. Based on the role of networks and interactions, previous socio-technical literature tends
to focus on the interactions among these elements (Geels, 2002; Verbeek and Slob, 2006 and
2006b). In this conceptual model, the IF is an additional, smaller field of action for agents.14 The
relationships within each component of the IF is not described, and neither the inclusion of
niches. This is because adopters find the IF as an integrated system of laws, financing and
economic opportunities/risks and technical solutions.
The IF is not a static or unchangeable: the relationships depicted by socio-technical scholars are
still in place. However, the IF is a ‘stock’ figure when the adoption decision is made. In other
words, potential adopters will not decide whether to adopt or not based on the possibility of
optimizing the IF. Rather, they will first change it and then make the adoption decision based on
the current IF. At most, uncertainty and instability can be a character of the IF.

14

See next section for agents’ description.
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Previous literature has studied the role of the IF on the diffusion processes in general, and the
one of renewable energy technologies (RETs) and DRETs in particular. Authors such as Nelson
and Winters (1982), Rip and Kemp (1998) and Geels (2002) focused on the coordinated
relationships existing among institutions, private companies, researchers and societal groups.
Others pictured the IF as a possible source of adoption impairment or, at most, research
advancements. Gillingham and Sweeney listed public organizations among potential barriers to
the diffusion of DRETs (Gillingham and Sweeney, 2012). Maes and Van Passel specifically
studied how policy and incentive design can prevent the spread of certain DRETs to be adopted
(Maes and Van Passel, 2012). The IF is not solely a negative element for the diffusion process of
DRETs. Verbrueggen et al. (2012) introduced a positive aspect of IF.15 In their work, the authors
listed the IF as source of research alongside the usual source of barriers to the diffusion of
DRETs. Despite focusing on networks, Nelson and Winters (1982), Rip and Kemp (1998) and
Geels (2002) admitted that the IF could have either a positive or a negative effect on diffusion. In
the sections dealing with the links among the three components of my model, I will explore how
these connections take place.
III.3 Adopting Agents
Definition: ‘The agent responsible for the final adoption decision’.
Examples: Households, commercial estates, private organizations.

The third subject of the conceptual model are adopting agents (AAs). I identify AAs as the
element responsible for making the adoption decision. This means that the agent can be any
potential adopter of a DRET, where the smallest case is the individual person.

15

In the present work, the adjective ‘positive’ indicates the presence of certain qualities rather than a moral qualification.
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The agents are the atoms constituting each of the upper levels in the diffusion model. In sociotechnical models, adopters are included in the meso-level and in the micro-level (Geels, 2002).
At the micro-level, adopters are nested within niches, which represent the main engine of
diffusion. At the meso-level, networks of adopters interact with other networks (e.g. producers)
to enable change and modify the landscape (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2002). In Hägerstrand’s
model, agents are the smallest unit of adoption: the have the ultimate decision of adoption and
enable technologies to diffuse faster (Hägerstrand, 1967). I draw from both Hägerstrand and
Geels: AAs are the basic subjects of the model. However, they are not necessarily households or
people. Additionally, their network and interactions become part of the IF as societal groups or
organizations.
Section IV: Interactions within the Conceptual model
This section describes how the various elements of the conceptual model interact with each other
and how they affect the diffusion of DRETs. Within the model, each element is both active and
passive at the same time. That is, each subject contribute to modify the others and it is affected
by these changes through the new inputs coming from the other subjects.
DRETs enter the model either spatially exogenously or endogenously. Spatially-exogenous
DRETs generate outside the AG and are imported in to it through the adoption. The adoption of a
new DRET is part of the innovation process (Hägerstrand, 1967). Spatially-endogenous DRETs
are generated within the AG and heavily rely on the role of the IF. The exogenous ones are
imported within the AG. In his work, Geels describes the dynamic of innovation hierarchically
through the sequence micro, meso and macro-levels. The first of these three levels is where
innovation takes place: niches are the engine of innovation, and they provide the networks at the
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meso-level with the fuel for changing the landscape (macro-level). The model presented here
focuses on the diffusion process, allows innovation to arise within any level.
IV.1 How Area Geography influences the IF
Whether labeled as landscape, environment or Area Geography, the influence exercised by the
physical elements of the world over human organizations and interactions has been one of the
leitmotif in geography. Starting the 1910s, works on environmental and climate determinism
have tried to uncover the links between nature and human activities, even if some authors
assumed extreme positions (Johnson, 1997).
In the model presented here, the AG interacts with the IF providing the resource endowment
available to DRETs. The endowment provided by the AG works like a budget constraint over the
IF. DRETs need fuel to generate energy in all its forms. This fuel can be wind, solar radiation,
biomass or any other renewable fuel. Every AG has a certain amount of fuel available. Partly,
this availability depends on the physical setting of the AG. For instance, an area with extensive
protected areas will have its resource endowment limited. An additional element defining the
resource endowment is the efficiency of the DRETs available through the IF. For instance, solar
panels that are more efficient result in an increased availability of solar energy. Figure 6 shows
how this push-pull effect affect the resource endowment. The dynamic of this effect follows that
one of a budget constraint usually adopted in microeconomics (Mass-Colell, 1995).
[Figure 6 About Here]
The AG does not only provides resources in a positive way. By imposing an endowment, even a
one that can be modified, the AG generates a pressure over the IF. This pressure generates the
incentive on the IF to find new renewable fuels.
IV.2 How the IF influences the Area Geography
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In the model, I borrow from the definitions and concepts of Hägerstrand and Geels, recombining
them in a way appropriate for the diffusion of process of DRETs. However, there are several
conceptual differences in from these two author. First, my model allows the IF to change the AG
at any time and at any rate. The IF can change the status quo of the AG for the diffusion of
DRETs very quickly. This situation can take place, for instance, in the case of major shocks,
such as the recent series of moratoria on nuclear power put in place in Germany after the
Fukushima-Daichi disaster in 2011 (Wittneben, 2012). The immediate consequence, among
others, has been the opening of new non-nuclear power plants and the consequent change in the
built environment. Second, differently from Hägerstrand, I include private organizations within
the IF.16 This is because in DRETs diffusion processes private organizations are part of the
‘offering’ made to the adopting agents, providing services and goods and influencing public
organizations in their legislative efforts.17
In my model, the IF has two major ways to shape the AG and influence the diffusion of DRETs:
1. Legislation (including Laws, Regulations and Policies, Hägerstrand, 2001);
2. Research and Development (Verbruggen et al., 2010; Fri, 2003);
3. Deployment.
According to Hägerstrand, ‘Legislation […] is the fundamental instrument of governing’
(Hägerstrand, 2001, p.43). Even those authors identifying public organizations as source of
barriers in the diffusion of renewable energies focus on this particular instrument (Verbrueggen
et al., 2010; Gillingham and Sweeney, 2012). Laws can modify the AG very quickly or over
time, as their period of implementation vary considerably. There are two examples that best
16

Unless all or part of these are among the potential adopters of a specific DRET.
Describing the dynamics within each of the subjects of my model is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I accept the description of
network-based interaction proposed by Geels (2002), although some of the elements part of the meso-level described by the Dutch author are
presented here as Adopting Agents.
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describe how legislation affect the AG of DRETs. First, consider the role of renewable portfolio
standards (RPS). RPS is ‘[…] a policy that requires electricity retailers to provide a minimum
percentage or quantity of their electricity supplies from renewable energy sources. An RPS
establishes a base level of demand but allows the market to determine which renewable energy
resources will meet that demand’ (Cory and Swezey, 2007). In recent years, national and local
governments have used RPS as a way to shift towards renewable energy generation. The
combination of RPS and subsidies directed to RETs in general have expanded the number of
RETs in adopting states.18 The changes in the AG occur through the diffusion of RETs and the
closure of non-RET plants (Gee, 2010). As a second example to show how legislation changes
the AG, consider districting and panning regulations. Local governments can either boost of tap
the availability of natural resources and locations for siting DRETs and RETs simply imposing a
ban on parks or banning the installation of solar panels on multi-story buildings. Areas belonging
to the AG have to be excluded as part of the resource endowment. This modification of the AG
can happen very quickly once the law/regulation is approved, thus showing that the AG is not
necessarily the most difficult level to modify.
The second tool is Research. The way Research changes the AG is easy to understand:
increasing the efficiency (or reducing the relative cost). Consequently, thanks to new
technologies and approaches, the same AG provides additional energy resources. Fri (2003) and
Verbruggen et al. (2010) allocate research to public institution. However, private companies are
among the largest investors in Research and Development (R&D) in most of the developed
countries. For example, in the USA, private organizations investments in Research and
Development amounted to 209.6% of investments in research from all other public sectors
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http://www.cleanenergystates.org/assets/2012-Files/RPS/RPS-SummitDec2012Barbose.pdf. Accessed on 08/11/2013.
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(Battelle, 2011).19 Similarly, within the European Union,20 the private sector invests the
equivalent of 1.26% of the gross domestic product in R&D, the public and non-profit sector only
0.76% (EUROSTAT, 2013). These data show the importance of including private organizations
and organizations in to the IF.21
Deployment is the last tool through which the IF affects the AG. Deployment refers to the
supply of DRETs and services in terms of market choices. Firms and public organizations make
DRETs influences the availability of DRETs within an AG not just through subsidies or other
policies. Marketing decisions and the physical availability of certain technologies are
fundamental factors in the spread of DRETs. Additionally, services associated with DRETs are
equally important. The lack of financing options or technologies such as smart and sub-metering
may affect hurt the diffusion of DRETs. This last concept is probably the one most strictly
dependent on the networks within the IF. Private organizations operate within their networks,
which are usually regulated by laws and policies.
IV.3 How the Area Geography interacts with Adopting Agents
The AG affects the decision process of AA through Culture. The term ‘Culture’ is wide in its
meaning. Authors such as Hägerstrand (1988), Geels (2001), Brown (1981), , Verbeek and Sloeb
(2006), Elzen (2006), Gee (2010) and Verbrueegen et al. (2010) have introduced in one form or
the other AG as a factor shaping the perceptions and behavior of people and human
organizations. Possibly, the best work to understand the meaning of the word Culture and its role
in shaping AA’s behavior towards the diffusion of DRETs come from the works of Dietz et al.
(2005) and Hägerstrand’s (1988). With the work ‘What about nature in Regional Sciences?’
19

The first number includes expenses by non-profit private organizations. Expenditures from Higher education institutions are aggregated in to
federal and other U.S. agencies.
20
EU-28.
21
Hagerstrand calls these ‘firms’. The terminology employed in the present paper (‘private organizations’ or ‘private institutions’) are more
appropriate because of their broader meaning.
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Hägerstrand eminently reintroduced the role of nature in to the discourse of diffusion. In
particular, the Swedish scholar has focused on the problems associated with limited resources
and the consequences these limits can have on development (Hägerstrand 2001). Hägerstrand
had an initial intuition of the effects of the AG over AAs in its original work on diffusion, as he
recognizes the spatiality of the adoption process through information and personal contact
(Hägerstrand, 1967). In the previous section of the present paper, we saw how these limits might
not be static, as the IF has the power to redefine the part of these constraints through research.
Nevertheless, the presence of constraints and definitions imposed by the AG are perceived by the
AAs through the formation of values-norms-beliefs. Figure 7 was developed by Prof. AtkinsonPalombo, and it is based on the work of Dietz et al. (2005).
[Figure 7 About Here]
In my model, I borrow from the concept developed by Prof. Atkinson-Palombo in that the model
shown in the figure above describes the relationships creating AAs behaviors. Building on these
concepts, I add the concepts of Culture, which generates memory. Through these memories,
behaviors are continued through time. However, the modification of the AG through these
behaviors ingenerate new changes in Values, which ignite changes in Beliefs and so on (Figure
8).
[Figure 8 About here]
AG contributes to the creation of Culture, which in turns affect values and, therefore,
environmentalism. Adoption of DRETs depends on environmental values, especially when
DRETs are more expansive then non-DRETs. The relationship between DRETs and the AG
affects the perception of that AAs have of the AG. Some changes affect this perception
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negatively to the point that agents oppose the diffusion of certain DRETs (Devine-Wright, 2007;
Gee, 2010). The perception of the AG is ‘passive’: AAs react to a change in the AG that was not
implemented by the AG itself, but, rather, by changes occurred by and within the IF. As an
example, consider the case of incentives introduced for adopting solar PV systems. If there is an
increase in adoption, the landscape will change, as more systems will appear on roofs and in
backyards. At that point, AAs may react negatively due to negative perception of solar PV
systems as part of the landscape. On the other hand, AAs may actually accelerate their adoption
rate because they see their landscape modified by peers, therefore increasing their confidence in
DRETs (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012). The dynamicity of landscape changes reinforces the
role of time in the diffusion process: Culture changes and perception changes along with the
landscape. The relationship between Time, Culture and Technological Change is well established
in geography since the 1980s (see Hägerstrand, 1988; Marchetti, 1988; Schwartz, 1988). The
addition of time as a common denominator of the system is required because it reinforces the fact
that not even the AG (or landscape in Atkinson-Palombo’s Figure) remains the same. The
‘dynamism of time’ has to be the constant, rather than a variable (Schwarz, 1988) or a ‘Cultural
structure’ (Marchetti, 1988), where the term ‘structure’ identifies a fixed element within the
study of technology diffusion.
Despite being an extremely strong force in affecting adoption decisions and patterns, the
relationship between the AG and AAs is complex, and still matter of study (Dietz et al., 2005;
Devine-Wright, 2007).

IV.4 How Adopting Agents influence Area Geography
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AAs influence and modify the AG through their behavior. Any potential AA acts within the AG.
A good example of this relationship involving DRETs is the behavior of households adopting
solar PV systems. The adoption itself modifies the AG, particularly in case of small-scale solar
farms. In general, any behavior of AAs affects the AG. For instance, increasing the demand of
energy under the current scenario generates further emissions, thus accelerating the global
increase in temperature and modifying the AG. As AAs, organizations affect the AG with their
decisions: opening a new plant and powering it with DRETs will affect the landscape. Figure 9
shows the effects of AA behavior over the AG along time. The behaviors are consequences of
the chain Values-Beliefs-Norms, particularly of those affecting environmentalism. This scheme
draws from the findings of Dietz et al. (2005). Behaviors affect the AG over time, contributing to
reshape the AG. The new form of the AG will affect Values through Culture, thus re-initiating
the cycle. The role played by time is extremely important: the decision of adoption of DRETs
does not face the same AG, and neither the same AAs. If this were the case, then diffusion of
DRETs would happen always in the same way within the same AGs.
[Figure 9 About Here]

3.4.5 How the Institutional Framework influences Adopting Agents
The IF influences the perception, behavior and DRETs adoption patterns of AAs in three ways:
1. Policies/Laws/Regulations (Policies);
2. Supply of DRETs; and
3. Education/Information (Education).
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Policies can either prevent, slow or encourage the adoption of DRETs. For example, the
prohibition of sub-metering affects the diffusion of DRETs technologies in rental and multifamily complexes in Connecticut (Bronin, 2012). On the other hand, subsidies can help to make
DRETs more affordable, lowering the barriers associated with capital requirements and
increasing the speed diffusion (Sarzynski et al., 2012).
The Supply of DRETs is the second way the IF interacts with AAs. In most cases, firms are the
suppliers, although there may be locations where public organizations play this role. The supply
of DRETs is fundamental, for most of the times AAs are not the developers of the technologies.
Additionally, when a potential adopter investigates the market to see what is available it will take
her decision based on the products offered.
Education influences the adoption decision of AAs in two ways. First, it affects the pre-adoption
process in that it provides AAs with the tools to understand and to know the direct and indirect
advantages of adopting DRETs. Literature has shown that higher education attainment and
training about DRETs increase the likelihood of adoption (Pierce et al. 2009; Tate et al., 2012).
Information plays a key-role in the diffusion of DRETs. Knowledge about the existence of
DRETs, their accessibility, their role and advantages positively affects acceptance and adoption
(Warren et al., 2005; Devine-Wright, 2007; Pierce et al. 2009; Tate et al., 2012). In general,
Education/Information shape the way in which AAs perceive DRETs, whereas Culture from the
AG shape adopters’ view of the environment and their environmental values.
IV.5 How the Adopting Agents influence the Institutional Framework
The last relationship arising within the factors of the model is the one generating from the AAs
and directed towards the IF. This flux of influence is particularly important as it bonds the most
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basic subject of the model with the container of the diffusion engine. AAs have influence the
actions of the IF in two ways:
1. Participation; and
2. Voting/Support.
Participation in the IF is the positive way through which AAs affect the IF. Within governmental
institutions, elected officials and administrative staff are both potential adopters and par of the
IF. Similarly, in private organizations, owners, workers, researchers are potential adopters and
part of the IF. Voting/Support is a less direct way through which AAs affect the IF. Certainly, the
base of AAs potentially involved in this action is broader: in democratic countries, all citizens
meeting certain age requirement can vote. In non-democratic countries, consensus is still an
important component for the ruling authority to maintain the status quo. Additionally,
organizations do not directly vote: nevertheless, they can affect voting decisions and divert
political support to specific DRETs through lobbying (Hughes and Lipscy, 2013).
Finally, a remark about prices. The AG provides a first constraint in terms of resource
endowment the IF and the AA can use. The networks within the AA and the IF are responsible
for setting the first levels of demand and supply. The encounter of these two forces will generate
the absolute and relative prices of DRETs. The IF through its internal networks generates any
distortion of the perfect market. The AAs will face the price, which, in turn, will affect their
decision. The decision of the AAs will influence the supply side, both at the production and at
the political level. For example, public organizations (e.g. government) may decide to fund
research to make DRETs cheaper, or cut tax subsidies towards fossil fuels.
IV.6 The Dynamic of DRETs Diffusion
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Changes in the ‘field-of-play’ or in the configuration of potential adopters are easy to relate with
changes in the diffusion
Figure 10 shows how a DRET will diffuse within the model. A similar figure would explain the
aggregate diffusion of all DRETs. For simplicity’s sake, I assume the DRET at hand to be
residential solar PV systems (RPV systems).
[Figure 10 about here]

The two constant in the diffusion process are Time and a measure of adoption (X and Y Axis
respectively). The former measures the how long the process requires. The latter records how
deep PV Systems have penetrated the study area. The additional axis measures the amount of
energy produced by all users combined. The diffusion process occurs within the three nested
subjects: the orange one, representing the total number of possible AAs is where the adoption
curve evolves. The area between the three subjects is where the events affecting the diffusion
take place. This area is the one where the connections described in the previous sections arise. In
the curve depicted above, I introduced four symbols, two minuses and two pluses. The former
represent events negatively affecting diffusion. The latter those boosting it. The region between
the subjects is where these events generates, ‘dropping’ on the pathway of the diffusion curve.
Initially, DPV Systems are introduced on the market and someone adopts them. The rate at
which this initial step occurs and the condition of adoption derive from the AG-IF-AAs
interaction. Usually, the increase in adoption at this stage is driven by factors inherent to the
AAs, such as environmental values and information. Decline in the diffusion/adoption curve
have multiple reasons. Decreases in energy prices can make a DRET too expensive. Similarly,
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logistic and other technical problems may arise in during the diffusion process, thus impairing
the adoption.
Section V
The model presented here allows understanding the three subjects affecting the diffusion of
DRETs within and area. There are several major important contributions produced by this model.
First, there is not specific hierarchy for the source of diffusion in terms of difficulty to modify
one of the factors. Thus, the AG changes quickly or slowly. Second, the heart of the process lies
not in one of the subjects, but, rather, in the relationships among them. Thus, if in Geels (2002)
the source of the engine was in ‘Niches’, in the present model the engine is a dynamic force,
emanated by the limits and structures existing within the study area. If not IF. AG or AAs existed
the adoption would be zero. If only AAs existed, then adoption would be 100%. Of course, this
case is impossible, as we should live in an endless world, with no resource-constraint, not even
time and space. If no IF existed, then the AAs could not overcome the limitations imposed by the
AG or develop DRETs at all.22 Third, with the inclusion of public and private organizations
together within the IF, the public sector is not necessarily a negative force anymore. Fifth, the
inclusion of the AG, a concept similar to the socio-technical ‘landscape’ provides the model with
space-dependency and scale dependency. As location matters, so does the interaction between
the location and the IF: the AG is the canvas where the IF decisions are shown. Sixth, policies
become spatially sensitive because of the need of spatial appropriateness introduced by the
model and based on Buttimer (2001). Policies failing to recognize the importance of the way the
AG is the reflection of the IF decisions may be incomplete, such as in the case of Connecticut
(Bronin, 2012). Seventh, adopting agents are not passive receivers of the diffusion process whose
22

Even in the case of ‘free donations’ from an exogenous IF (e.g. a foreign country) a minimal IF would be et-up to educate and inform the AAs
of the DRET specifications.
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decision rest in the adoption itself. Rather, they can actively change the AG and the IF, that is,
they are the process itself. Whether they are depicted as networks (e.g. in Geels, 2002; Bollinger
and Gillingham, 2012) or as single agents, AAs are affected by the diffusion process, which, in
turn, modifies every level of the model. Finally, because the three subjects change, time becomes
part of the model: situations or dioramas generated by the model are not static, but follow paths
created by the interaction among the subjects of the diffusion process. The major consequence is
that the model does not describes the diffusion process at a specific point in time, but, rather,
provides the elements to understand the path followed by the adoption/diffusion process.
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Figures

Figure 1. The Place of DRETs in Research
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Figure 2. Historic Perspective of Literature on DRETs Diffusion

Figure 3. Components of the Conceptual model

51

Figure 4. Multiple levels as a nested hierarchy (Geels, Fig.3, 2002)

Figure 5. The multi-actor network involved in sociotechnical regimes. (Geels, 2002, Figure
2)
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Figure 6 The Push-Pull Effect Defining the AG Resource Endowment

Figure 7. Values-Beliefs-Norms Influence over Behavior
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Figure 8. AG Influencing the Adopting Agents

Figure 9. Values-Beliefs-Norms Influence over Are (see notes)
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Figure 10. Diffusion of DRETs in Conceptual model
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Spatial Patterns of Solar Photovoltaic System Adoption: The
Influence of Neighbors and the Built Environment
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1. Introduction
Economists and geographers have long been interested in the factors governing the patterns of
diffusion of new technologies. Since the work of Hägerstrand (1952) and Rogers (1962), many
authors have explored the characteristics of technology diffusion and the role of policies,
economic factors, and social interactions in influencing the waves of diffusion seen for many
new products (Bass, 1969; Brown, 1981; Webber, 2006; Towe and Lawley, 2013).
Understanding the patterns of diffusion—and particularly spatial patterns—is important not only
from a scholarly perspective, but also from a policy and from marketing perspective. This is
especially true when examining the diffusion of technologies with both private and public good
characteristics, such as renewable energy technologies.
This paper examines the spatial pattern of adoption of an increasingly important renewable
energy technology: residential rooftop solar photovoltaic systems (henceforth “PV systems”).
Our study area is the state of Connecticut (CT), which has actively used state policy to promote
PV system adoption. We explore the patterns of diffusion using geostatistical approaches,
finding that diffusion of PV systems in CT tends to emanate from smaller and midsized
population centers in a wave-like centrifugal pattern. To explain the factors underlying these
patterns of adoption, we perform a panel data analysis of the effects of nearby previous
adoptions, built environment, demographic, socioeconomic, and political affiliation variables on
PV system adoptions. We develop a new set of spatiotemporal variables that both capture recent
nearby adoptions and retain the ability to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the Census
block group level. We find clear evidence of spatial neighbor effects (often known as “peer
effects”) from recent nearby adoptions that diminish over time and space. For example, our
results indicate that adding one more installation on average within 0.5 miles of adopting

57

households in the year prior to the adoption increases the number of installations in a block
group by 0.30 PV systems. We also find that built environment variables, such as housing
density and the share of renter-occupied dwellings, are also important factors influencing the
adoption of PV systems that are just as important as factors such as median household income
and political affiliation.
Several recent studies have explored the diffusion of PV systems in different contexts.
McEachern and Hanson (2008) study the adoption process of PV systems across 120 villages in
Sri Lanka and find that PV system adoption is driven by expectations of the government
connecting the villages to the electricity grid, as well as tolerance for non-conformist behavior in
the villages. Such findings suggest the possibility of social interactions influencing the decision
to adopt a PV system, in line with a large literature on spatial knowledge spillovers in the form
of neighbor or peer effects (e.g., Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1992), Foster and
Rosenzweig (1995), Bayer, Pintoff, and Pozen (2009), Conley and Udry (2010)).
Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) are the first to demonstrate an effect of previous nearby
adoptions on PV system adoption. Specifically, Bollinger and Gillingham use a large dataset of
PV system adoptions in California (CA) to show that one additional previous installation in a zip
code increases the probability of a new adoption in that zip code by 0.78%. Bollinger and
Gillingham find evidence of even stronger neighbor effects at the street level within a zip code
and use a quasi-experiment to verify their results. Richter (2013) uses a similar empirical
strategy to find small but statistically significant neighbor effects in PV system adoption at the
postcode district level in the United Kingdom. Both studies artificially constrain such effects
along postal boundaries, potentially risking spatial measurement error. Such artificial boundaries
also prevent an analysis of how the effect dissipates over time and space. Moreover, these studies
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do not explore the spatial patterns of diffusion PV systems, which may provide insight into
future technology diffusion.
Rode and Weber (2013) use spatial bands around grid points to reduce the possible
measurement error bias from artificial borders. Using an epidemic diffusion model, they estimate
localized imitative adoption behavior in Germany that diminishes over space. Their approach
uses over 550,000 observations coded around a grid of points 4 km to 20 km apart covering
Germany. Müller and Rode (2013) focus on a single city in Germany, Wiesbaden, and use the
actual physical distance between new adoptions in a binary panel logit model. Müller and Rode
also find a clear statistically significant relationship between previous nearby adoptions that
diminishes with distance.23 Neither Rode and Weber (2013) nor Müller and Rode (2013) explore
the spatial patterns of diffusion of other factors that may influence PV system adoption.
All studies attempting to identify a spatial neighbor or peer effect must argue that they overcome
the classic identification challenges of identifying peer effects: homophily, correlated
unobservables, and simultaneity (Brock & Durlaf, 2001; Manski, 1993; Moffit, 2001; Soetevent,
2006). Homophily, or self-selection of peers, could bias an estimate of a spatial peer effect
upward if neighbors with similar views and interests move to the same neighborhoods. If there is
self-selection of peers, the coefficient on the previous nearby installations would simply capture
common preferences. Correlated unobservables, such as localized marketing campaigns, would
also clearly pose an endogeneity concern. Finally, simultaneity or “reflection” could also bias
estimates to the extent that one is affected by their peers just as their peers affect them.24

23

Rai and Robinson (2013) provide further evidence suggestive of neighbor effects with survey data of PV adopters
in Austin, Texas. Of the 28% of the 365 respondents who were not the first in their neighborhood to install, the vast
majority expressed that their neighbors provided useful information for their decision.
24
See Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) for a mathematical exposition of each of these issues.
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Hartmann et al. (2008) discusses approaches to address each of these identification issues,
including the fixed effects and quasi-experimental approaches taken in some studies, such as
Bollinger and Gillingham (2012). In this study, we address the possibility of homophily with a
rich set of fixed effects at the Census block group level. To control for the possibility of timevarying correlated unobservables, we include block group-semester fixed effects. Finally,
simultaneity is not a concern for our estimation of spatial neighbor effects because we use
previously installed PV systems. Our fixed effects strategy also addresses potential confounders
for the other factors we examine that may influence the adoption of PV systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide institutional
background on the solar PV system market in our area of study, CT. In Section 3 we present our
data sources and summarize our detailed dataset of PV systems in CT. Section 4 analyzes the
spatial patterns of diffusion of PV systems using geostatistical approaches. In Section 5 we
describe our approach to empirical estimation, including the development of our spatiotemporal
variables, our empirical model, and identification strategy. Section 6 presents our empirical
results, showing the primary factors that have influenced diffusion of solar PV in CT, such as
spatial neighbor effects and area geography. Finally, Section 7 concludes with a discussion of
our findings and policy implications.

2.

Background on Solar Policy in Connecticut

The state of CT is a valuable study area for the diffusion of PV systems. Despite less solar
insolation than more southerly states, CT is surprisingly well suited for solar with high electricity
prices, a relatively dispersed population with many suitable rooftops, and few other renewable
energy resources (EIA, 2013; REMI, 2007). Moreover, the CT state government has been very
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supportive of promoting solar PV technology, with several ambitious state programs. At the
utility level, electric suppliers and distribution companies in CT are required to meet a
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) that requires 23 percent of electricity to be generated by
renewable energy sources by 2020. Furthermore, CT Public Act 11-80 of 2011 requires the CT
Clean Energy Finance and Investment Authority (CEFIA) to develop programs leading to at least
30 MW of new residential solar PV by December 31, 2022. This solar energy can be used in
support of the utility RPS requirement, leading to more utility support for PV systems than in
other states (DSIRE, 2013).
The CEFIA programs involve both state incentives, which started at $5/W in 2005 and are
currently $1.25/W for resident-owned systems up to 5kW (there is a slightly different incentive
scheme for third-party owned systems), as well as a series of community-based programs to
promote PV systems (CADMUS, 2014).25 These programs, begun in 2012, designate “Solarize”
towns that choose a preferred installer, receive a group buy that lowers the price with more
installations, and receive an intensive grassroots campaign with information sessions and local
advertising. The first phase of the program involved four towns, subsequently expanded to five
by March 2013. The program currently involves 30 participating towns out of the 169 across the
state, and has been quite successful in increasing the number of installations in these towns
(Solarize CT, 2013).26

25

As of 01/06/2014; incentive for system above 5kW is $0.75/W, up to 10 kW. These values refer to the Residential
Solar Investment Program. Performance-based incentives are also available and are currently set at $0.18 kW/h.
26
The Phase I Towns are: Durham, Fairfield, Portland and Westport. The Phase II Towns are: Bridgeport, Canton,
Coventry, and Mansfield/Windham. The current towns (as of February 2014) are: Ashford, Chaplin, Hampton,
Pomfret, Cheshire, Columbia, Lebanon, Easton, Redding, Trumbull, Enfield, Glastonbury, Greenwich, Hamden,
Manchester, Newtown, Roxbury, Washington, Stafford, West Hartford and West Haven. Some towns participate as
a joint effort.
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3.

Data

To study the drivers and the spatial patterns of PV systems adoption in CT, we rely on several
sources, as described in this section.

3.1 PV System Adoptions
CEFIA collects and maintains a database with detailed technical and financial characteristics of
all residential PV systems adopted in state that received an incentive since the end of 2004. The
database, updated monthly, contains detailed PV system characteristics for nearly all installations
in CT.27 Two variables are particularly important for this study: the application date and address.
Using the address information, we successfully geocoded 3,833 PV systems that were installed
in CT from 2005 through the end of September 2013 at the Census block group level out of the
3,843 installations in the database.

[ FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ]

Despite a slight reduction in new systems in 2011, CT residents have steadily adopted an
increasing number of residential PV systems each quarter, as shown in Figure 1. In the last four
quarters for which data are available, adoptions averaged 340 per quarter, or 11.7% increase
from quarter to quarter. We will explore the spatial patterns of this technology diffusion in
Section 4.

3.2 Demographic, Socioeconomic, and Voting Data

27

Our understanding is that the only PV systems not in the CEFIA database are those in the small municipal utility
regions (e.g., Wallingford, Norwich, and Bozrah). We expect that these are few.
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We focus our analysis on the Census block group level, which is the most disaggregated level
available for which key variables, such as median household income, are available. There are
2,585 block groups in CT. We drop ocean block groups, and those including only university
campuses or prisons, such as Yale University in New Haven and the prison block groups in
Somers. We retained 2,574 (99.6% of the block groups).
We employ socioeconomic and demographic data from several waves of the U.S. Census. We
use the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Decennial Census as well as the 2005-2009, 2006-2010, and 20072011 waves of the American Community Survey (ACS) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). Since
Census boundaries changed after the 2005-2009 ACS, we convert the 2000 Census and 20052009 ACS to the 2010 Census boundaries. For this conversion, we calculate the share of land
assigned and lost to and from each block group and then take a weighted average of the variables
in the 2000 boundaries based on land area. Once all of the Census data are based on 2010
boundaries, we use a quadratic regression to interpolate values for the unobserved years,
providing a panel of socioeconomic and demographic data.28 We also add the Dow Jones
Industrial Average stock market prices (not varying over block groups), which may be
particularly important in our setting, given the strong influence of the financial sector in CT
(FRED, 2013). In addition, we bring in the statewide annual electricity price average from the
preceding year to account for changes in electricity prices, which may affect the attractiveness of
PV systems (EIA, 2013).
We also use voter registration data provided by the Connecticut Secretary of State (SOTS).
These data are collected on the last week of October of every year (CT SOTS, 2013). They

28

We use the mid-point of each ACS to provide values for 2007, 2008, and 2009. We carefully checked the
interpolation and when it led to unrealistically low or high values, we cut off the values at 18 years for a minimum
median age, 70 years for a maximum median age, and we cut all probabilities at 0 and 100.
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include both active and inactive registered voters for each of the major political parties, as well
as total voter registration. Unfortunately, SOTS data only provide aggregate data on “minor
party” registration, so we are unable to separately identify enrollment in green and environmental
parties from enrollment in other minor parties, such as the libertarian party. Using an analogous
methodology to our approach for the Census data, we develop an estimate for block group-level
political affiliation from the precinct-level data provided.
We calculate housing density by dividing population by land area. The land area field used is
‘ALAND’ in shapefiles available from the Map and Geographic Information Center (MAGIC) at
the University of Connecticut (MAGIC, 2013). ‘ALAND’ is not the ideal field, for there may be
land uses that should not be included (e.g., wetlands and forest) and it misses local differences in
types of housing units. However, it captures the broader differences in housing across block
groups quite well, with higher housing density in center cities and decreasing housing density
further out. In Table 1, we summarize the descriptive statistics for each variable.
[ TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ]

3.3 Spatial Data
To examine the factors influencing patterns of diffusion of PV systems, we combine spatial data
(GIS layers and map data) with the adoption data contained in the CEFIA Solar database. Our
sources for the spatial data are the CT Department of Energy and Environmental Protection
(DEEP, 2013) and the University of Connecticut MAGIC data holdings mentioned above.

4.

Spatial Patterns of PV System Diffusion

4.1 Adoption Rates across Towns in Connecticut
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The diffusion of PV systems displays surprising spatial patterns across CT. Figure 2 shows the
density of PV systems at the town level as of September 2013.29 The two upper corners of the
state show higher per-capita density, with northwestern Connecticut recording among the highest
values. These towns are mostly rural or semi-rural communities, with a strong presence of
vacation homes for residents of the New York and the Greater Boston areas. In the southerncentral part of the state, the town of Durham (a Phase I Solarize town) shows among the highest
rate of adoption in the state.
[ FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ]

A knowledgeable CT resident will quickly observe that PV system adoption does not entirely
follow patterns of income in CT. For example, the southwestern corner of the state hosts some of
the wealthiest municipalities in the U.S., yet displays a lower rate of adoption than much less
wealthy towns in southeastern CT. This can be seen clearly in Figure 3.

[ FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ]

4.2 Hot Spots and Cold Spots in PV System Diffusion
Looking at adoption rates by town provides insight, but aggregating results at the town level
imposes artificial boundaries, reducing the effects of agglomerations at the edges of towns,
which may be particularly problematic for smaller and more densely populated towns. For a
clearer picture of the location of agglomeration clusters of PV systems, we use two well-known
spatial techniques: Optimized Getis-Ord method (OGO) and Anselin’s Cluster and Outlier
Analysis (COA) (Anselin, 1995; Getis & Ord, 1992; Ord & Getis, 1995). These approaches have
29

As mentioned above, Norwich, Bozrah, and Wallingford are served by municipal utility companies and do not
participate in the CEFIA incentive program. Thus, these towns have no data.
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been applied to many fields, from epidemiology (Robinson, 2000) to land use change and
sustainability (Su, Jiang, Zhang, & Zhang, 2011). By identifying agglomeration clusters and
mapping them against other spatial factors, these approaches provide guidance on the underlying
factors influencing adoption.
We run all three of these techniques using ESRI’s ArcMap 10.2. All three require aggregated
data, in order to achieve variability within the adoption values. Our scale is the block group
level, thus we use the geographic center (centroid) of each bock group as the point. For COA, we
use a 10-mile threshold and an inverse distance spatial relationship. OGO chooses the threshold
to optimize the balance between statistical significance and observation size and thus is selfselected by ArcGIS. Of course, these methodologies are sensitive to the input parameters, so we
test each with different thresholds, starting at 1-mile radius around each block group centroid, up
to the cutoff distance of 10 miles. We find little difference in the results. In fact, in GOH, results
did not change appreciably even using the maximum distance in the study area as the threshold.
Figure 4 presents the results of the spatial analysis. For reference, Panel A shows the housing
density in CT by Census block group and the geocoded PV systems. Panel B presents the results
from the OGO approach and Panel C the results from the COA approach. Hartford is highlighted
as a reference town across the maps.

[ FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE ]
The results are quite consistent across the three methodologies: there is clustering of hot spots in
the northeastern, central-eastern, and southeastern parts of CT. In addition, there is a hotspot in
Fairfield County in southwestern CT. There is a clustering of cold spots through the middle of
the state, which corresponds with the most densely populated urban areas, which includes urban
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areas such New Haven, Bridgeport, Meriden, and Waterbury. Remarkably, there also appears to
be a cold spot in some of the wealthiest areas of CT in the southeast, which includes towns such
as Greenwich and Stamford. These initial results do not mean that income plays no role in the
adoption process. Rather, it suggests that policies aimed solely at lowering the cost of PV
systems are not enough, and policymakers need to undertake other efforts in order to spread the
adoption of PV systems. These maps greatly enrich our view of the diffusion of PV systems from
Figure 4 and underscore the complex relationships between housing density and income, and the
rate of PV system adoption.

4.3 Spatial Patterns of Diffusion over Time
The diffusion of any new technology is a dynamic process, which often exhibits a characteristic
spatial pattern over time. For example, classic diffusion models often show that new
technologies are adopted in a centrifugal, wave-like pattern, starting from larger population
centers (e.g., see Hägerstrand (1952) and Brown (1981)).
To examine the pattern of diffusion over time and space, we use fishnetting (Mitchell, 2005). We
specify the size of each cell in the fishnet as 1.5 miles, a length small enough to effectively
disaggregate our block group level data, but large enough to capture more than one adoption in
each cell. Figure 5 illustrates our fishnetting analysis for adoption at the end of 2005 and at the
end of our dataset in 2013. Each colored cell displays the actual number of installations within
2.25 sq. miles.

[ FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE ]
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In Figure 5, we highlight two areas: Westport-Fairfield (black circle) and Windham-Mansfield
(blue circle). In Westport-Fairfield, we see a case of town that already had PV system adoptions
in 2005, and these adoptions multiplied substantially by 2013. In contrast, Windham-Mansfield
had no adoptions in 2005 and had very few adoptions in neighboring cities. Yet, with the Phase
II Solarize program providing a major boost, the two towns now have a very high density of PV
systems, with up to 24 adoptions in 4.5 sq. miles. These examples highlight the factors that
influence the dynamics of the diffusion process in CT: areas “seeded” with installations early on
appear to have an increasing density of adoption, while at the same time programs like Solarize
can transform the number of PV systems in a locality in a short amount of time.
The fishnetting approach is also well-suited for testing the hypothesis that the diffusion of PV
systems follows the typical pattern of diffusion from larger population centers. To examine the
spatial relationship between population and PV system adoption, we map the town population
along with the fishnet of PV system adoptions for 2005, 2008, and 2013 in Figure 6. The ten
largest towns by population are outlined in red and the ten smallest towns are outlined in black.

[ FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE ]
If the adoption process of PV systems followed a wave-like centrifugal pattern based in the
largest towns, we would expect to see initial concentrations within the largest towns in the state,
with adoptions multiplying within these areas and diffusing to the smaller towns over time. The
pattern we observe differs from these expectations in two ways.
First, it appears that PV systems diffuse not only from the largest centers, but also from many
midsized and smaller towns. For example, consider Durham, in south-central CT, with a
population of 7,388, which is about a third of the state mean of 21,300 residents per town.
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Durham hosted one of the very first PV systems, and, as of September 2013, it has the highest
number of PV systems in the state (143), thanks in part to the Solarize CT program. Second, new
agglomeration centers appear over time in areas that did not have installations in 2005. For
example, the town of Bethlehem (pop. 3,607) had neither a single PV system in 2005 nor a
neighboring town with one. By the end of 2008, the town still had very few adoptions. By 2013
it had 23 PV systems. Interestingly, it appears that by 2013, Bethlehem served as a small center,
with neighboring areas also adopting PV systems in a centrifugal pattern around the center.
Why might we see medium-sized and smaller towns acting as centers for diffusion of PV
systems, in contrast to the classic results? The combination of the technical characteristics of PV
systems along with the built environment and institutional setting in CT provides likely
explanations. Most directly, PV systems are most suitable for single-family housing, due to the
larger roof space and lack of split incentives that multifamily dwellings must contend with.
Many of the single-family homes in CT that are well-suited for PV systems are in smaller
communities. Many of the better off-communities in CT are also small communities, and PV
system customers must be able to afford the investment. In addition, local permitting regulations
and fees have an important influence on the speed and difficulty of installing a PV system. A
new pro-solar local administration can expedite the process of installing a PV system and
provide an example for neighboring towns. This could quickly change a town from a town with
few adoptions to source of diffusion waves. The Solarize program has the potential to do the
same.
These results, while deviating from the classic models of diffusion, make sense and may apply in
other contexts as well. Of course, a different set of regulatory, socioeconomic, and technological
characteristics would likely create a very different pattern. The results in McEachern and Hanson
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(2008), indicating a wave-like pattern emanating from peripheral villages with limited
connection to the central grid is a case in point. In the next section, we turn to an empirical
model designed to explore the factors that underlie the spatial diffusion patterns observed here.

5.

Empirical Approach

5.1 Creation of the Spatiotemporal Neighbor Variables
One major factor that may mediate the diffusion of solar PV is the presence of spatial neighbor
effects. At the heart of our empirical approach is our methodology for creating spatiotemporal
variables to capture the influence of previous neighboring installations on adoption.
For each PV system application in the database, we record how many PV systems had previously
been completed within a 0.5, 1, and 4 mile radius of the installation. We make the calculation
recording the number of installations within each radius in the 12 months prior to the installation,
24 months prior to the installation, and since 2005 (there were very few installations prior to
2005 in CT). In other words, for each PV system k we counted the number of neighboring
installations j, such that:
dk,j <= D
and
tk – tj <= T or tk => tj ,
where dk,j is the Euclidean distance (in feet) between PV system k and j, D is the distance
specification (2640, 5280 or 21120 feet), tk is the application date of PV system k, tj is the
application date of PV system j, and T is the temporal lag (12 months or 24 months). To more
precisely examine the effect at each distance, we subtract the inner distances from the outer radii,
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in order to see an effect within 0.5 miles, from 0.5 to 1 mile, and from 1 mile to 4 miles. This
approach is a multiple-ring buffer method, where the buffers are both spatial and temporal, as
shown graphically in Figure 7.

[ FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE ]

Importantly, we remove other installations with applications during the same year-quarter (e.g.,
2005Q1) as the household adopting in the count of recent neighbors adopting. This entirely
avoids the simultaneity, or reflection, problem discussed in the introduction and reduces the
likelihood that the decision to install is made before some of the other neighbors chose to install,
for some households may have made the decision before the application is submitted.30
These spatiotemporal counts of nearby PV systems capture the relevant previous installations
that we hypothesize will influence the household decision to adopt a PV system. We finally
convert these variables to the block group-level by calculating the mean of the spatiotemporal
count in that block group for each of the radii and period. This provides a useful measure of the
average number of neighbors that are influencing new adopters in a block group. Since the
variable is at the block group-level, it can be matched with our Census data to allow for a panel
data analysis. We call these block group-level variables our “spatiotemporal neighbor” variables.
This approach has significant advantages over the previous approaches to quantifying spatial
neighbor effects. For example, Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) use variables for the cumulative
number of installations in a zip code, which they call the “installed base,” as well as the
cumulative number of installations on a street in a zip code. Estimates based on the zip code may

30

It turns out that removing these installations does not change our primary results much at all, but for consistent
estimation of our coefficients, we recognize that this is important.
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be subject to a measurement error bias, analogous to the well-known areal bias (e.g. Openshaw
(1984)), for there is a clear bias for households on the edge of zip codes. Moreover, zip codes are
much larger than block groups.
Müller and Rode (2013) avoid this potential measurement error bias by examining the distance
between 286 geocoded buildings with PV systems in Wiesbaden, Germany. Despite the small
sample, this is an improvement over a zip code-level or street-level analysis. However, from a
spatial perspective, several possible errors were introduced: issues with geocoding led to 149 of
the PV systems assigned to proximate buildings and 38 PV systems that were second or third
systems on these buildings are allocated to nearby buildings rather than assigned to the building
they were on. From an econometric perspective, a reader may also be concerned that no effort
was taken to address the classic issues in identifying peer effects discussed in the introduction.
We feel that our approach is a useful compromise that allows for a block group panel data
analysis to address peer effect identification concerns, while at the same time leveraging careful
spatial analysis to reduce spatial measurement error.

5.2 Model of Demand for PV Systems
To examine the factors that influence residential PV system adoption, we model the demand for
residential PV systems in a block group i and at time t as a function of a variety of
socioeconomic, demographic, political affiliation, built environment, policy, and installed base
variables. Our specification can be parsimoniously written as follows:

PVcounti,t =α + Ni,t β + Bi,t γ + Di,t θ + π Si,t + µi + φt + εi,t
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(3)

where PVcounti,t is the number of new PV system adoptions in block group i at time t; Ni,t is a
vector of the spatiotemporal neighbor variables described above (we run separate regressions for
12 months prior and 24 months prior); Bi,t is a vector of built environment variables; Di,t is a
vector of socioeconomic, demographic, and political affiliation variables; Si,t is the percentage of
installations in the block group-year that are from a Solarize campaign; µi are block group fixed
effects; φt are time dummy variables; and εi,t is a mean-zero error term.31 In one of our
specifications we consider the number of new adoptions in a year-quarter (i.e., 2005Q1), so t is
the year-quarter. In addition, we also examine a specification with block group-semester fixed
effects (the two semesters are defined as the January through June and July through December).
In this specification, µi and φt would be combined into a single interaction fixed effect.
Vector Di,t contains variables for the Dow Jones Industrial Average to capture overall economic
conditions, the electricity price (largely constant within utility region over time), median age, a
dummy for the median age being in the oldest 5% of our sample to capture concentrations of
elderly, percentage of population who are white, percentage of the population who are black,
percentage of the population who are Asian, median household income, percentage of registered
voters who are democrats, and percentage of voters who are registered to minority parties (e.g.,
the green party or libertarian party). These variables in are important controls and are also useful
to interpret. For example, the political affiliation variables help us understand the effects of
environmental values on the adoption of PV systems, for democrats consistently tend to vote in
favor of RPS regulations (Coley & Hess, 2012).
The vector of built environment variables Bi,t includes the housing density, the number of
houses, and the share of renters. These variables control for differences in the number of
31

We use a fixed effects approach, as a Hausman test results allow us to reject the orthogonality assumption of the
random effects model at 99% confidence level.
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households available to install PV systems. Finally, our block group fixed effects and time
dummies are critical for controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at the block group level and
over time. For example, block group fixed effects control for any non-time-varying block groupspecific unobservables, such as a solar installer being headquartered in that location. Time
dummies help control for broader trends in increased adoption over time due to lower prices and
increased awareness of PV systems. Furthermore, our results with block group-semester fixed
effects address the possibility that there are localized trends that work at the sub-yearly level that
could confound our estimates of our estimate of the peer effect. For instance, if a new solar
installer moved into a block group, we might see a surge of adoptions in a localized area.

5.3 Estimation and Identification
We estimate this model first using a linear fixed effects approach and then using a Negative
Binomial approach as a robustness check. The Negative Binomial model is a common approach
for use with count data when the mean of the count variable does not equal the variance, but it
involves additional structural assumptions about the relationship (e.g., see Cameron and Trivedi
(1998)). We also examine the results of a Poisson model as an additional check.
Our approach follows the logic in Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) and discussed in Hartmann et
al. (2008) by using a flexible set of fixed effects to identify spatial peer effects. Block group
fixed effects clearly control for endogenous group formation leading to self-selection of peers
(homophily). Simultaneity, whereby one household influences others at the same time that they
are influenced by others is addressed by the temporal lag between when the household decision
to adopt is made and when others have adopted. Specifically, we create our spatiotemporal
installed base variables in such a way that we are focusing on the effect of previous installations
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on the decision to adopt. Finally, we flexibly control for correlated unobservables, such as timevarying marketing campaigns or the opening up of a new headquarters by an installer, with block
group-semester fixed effects. These approaches follow the state-of-the-art in the literature in
identifying peer effects in the absence of a quasi-experiment and at the same time address
possible identification concerns regarding the coefficients on the other covariates of interest.

6.

Results

6.1 Primary Results
We are particularly interested in the vector of parameters β, which tells us the extent to which
spatial neighbor effects influence the decision to adopt PV systems. In addition, we are also
interested in many of the other coefficients to help us better understand the influence of different
built environment, socioeconomic, political affiliation, and demographic factors on the decision
to adopt.
In Table 2, we present our primary results. The first two columns present OLS results with yearquarter dummy variables, to control for changing trends in the PV system market, but no block
group fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 present results with both year-quarter dummy variables and
block group fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the block group level.
Columns 5 and 6 present results with block group-year-semester fixed effects to address possible
time-varying correlated unobservables. Each column uses a different vector of spatiotemporal
variables. The first column includes all nearby installations in the previous 12 months and the
second includes all nearby installations in the previous 24 months, and the third all nearby
installations since the beginning of our dataset (January 1, 2005). Our preferred results are those
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with block group-year-semester fixed effects in columns 4 through 6, although we are comforted
that the results are quite similar regardless of the fixed effects used.
[ TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ]
Our results show clear evidence suggestive of a spatial neighbor effect. Regardless of whether
we include block group or block group-year-semester fixed effects, our spatiotemporal variables
are positive, statistically significant and of a similar magnitude. This finding demonstrates that
the mean number of installations surrounding households increases the number of adoptions in
that block group. For example, in column 5, the coefficient on the number of neighbors within
0.5 miles indicates that if the households that install PV systems have on average one additional
nearby installation within 0.5 miles in the previous 12 months, then the number of installations in
the block group per quarter will increase by 0.30 PV systems. At the average number of block
groups in a town (15), this implies 18 additional PV systems per town due to the spatial neighbor
effect.
Furthermore, the change in the results across space and time is intuitive. The coefficients are
generally smaller when we consider installations that are further away, such as between 0.5 and
one mile, and between 1 and 4 miles (although not always statistically significant). These results
are consistent with Bollinger and Gillingham (2012), who find evidence of a stronger effect of
neighboring installations at the street level than at the zip code level. Similarly, the coefficients
for each of the spatiotemporal variables are smaller as we move from the 12 month to the 24
month results, suggesting a diminishing spatial peer effect over time.
In contrast to Rode and Weber (2013), and Müller and Rode (2013), the spatial peer effect does
not appear to fade after 1 or 1.2 km. While the magnitude of the coefficient decreases with
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distance, it is still highly statistically and economically significant in the 1 to 4 mile range.32 This
result may be explained in part by a difference in area geography. Wiesbaden, the city studied by
Müller and Rode (2013), is an urban area with a population density almost double the population
density in CT (CIA, 2013; Statistik Hessen, 2013). Moreover, the transportation system and
physical mobility is quite different: CT has 0.86 vehicles per capita, while Wiesbaden has only
0.52 (Bank, 2013; DOE, 2013). We would expect spatial peer effects to extend over a larger area
when potential adopters tend to move further to pursue their normal social interactions.
Our results also highlight the important role of our built environment variables. Consistent with
our geospatial analysis, housing density appears to decrease adoption. Similarly, the share of
renters decreases adoption. These results are consistent with the presence of split incentive
problems in multi-family and renter-occupied dwellings (Bronin, 2012; Gillingham, Harding, &
Rapson, 2012; Gillingham & Sweeney, 2012). In owner-occupied multifamily dwellings, it may
not be possible to prevent free-ridership and recoup the costs of the installation. Similarly, when
the landlord pays for electricity in a rental arrangement, the landlord may not be able to contract
with the renter to pay for the cost of the installation. Even when the renter pays for electricity,
there may still be barriers: the renter may not have permission to install a PV system and may not
plan on staying in the dwelling long enough to make a PV system pay off.
Our results show less statistically significant results when it comes to most other socioeconomic
and demographic variables. There is weak evidence that higher median household income
increases adoption, which may not be surprising, given the complicated spatial relationship
shown in Section 4 between income and PV system adoption, The racial variables are largely not
statistically significant, with only weak evidence of more adoption when there is a higher

32

We also performed specifications with a 1 to 2 and 2 to 4 mile range, which show a similar pattern, but with less
statistical significance.
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percentage of whites in the block group and a lower percentage of non-whites. There is weak
evidence that a higher median age increases adoption, but block groups with the very highest
median age appear to have lower adoption. The political affiliation variables are not statistically
significant, nor is the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
On the other hand, the electricity price is positive and highly statistically significant until the
block group-year-semester fixed effects are applied. The result can be interpreted as indicating
that a one dollar increase in the electricity cost increases the number of adoptions in a block
group and a year-quarter by 0.5 to 0.6 additional installations. The percentage of PV systems that
are part of the Solarize program is an important control when we do not have block group-yearsemester fixed effects, for it is a localized marketing campaign. Not surprisingly, it is highly
statistically significant until we add the block-group-year-semester fixed effects. The results
suggest that a one-percentage point increase in Solarize adoptions in a block group leads to small
(0.005 additional installations) increase in adoptions in that block group. This may be more
sizable at the town level when a larger percentage increase in Solarize programs is considered.
To summarize, we find strong evidence of localized spatial neighbor effects and built
environment variables influencing the adoption of PV systems and much weaker evidence of
other socioeconomic, demographic, and political affiliation variables influencing adoption. This
result may seem surprising, but in light of the spatial patterns seen in Section 4, it makes a great
deal of sense.

6.2 Robustness Checks
We perform a several robustness checks on our results in Table 2, such as varying the spatial
distance and time frame of our spatiotemporal variables and exploring additional fixed effects
specifications. We do not report these results here for they are entirely consistent with the results
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in Table 2. We do report the results using the cumulative number of adoptions in each block
group (the “installed base”) rather than the spatiotemporal variables in order to compare our
specification to that in Bollinger and Gillingham (2012). Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 shows the
results of our specifications in columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 for reference. Column 3 shows the
same specification with the same controls, only with the cumulative installed base, rather than
our spatiotemporal variables. The results indicate a highly statistically significant positive effect,
indicating that one additional installation in the installed base increases adoptions in a block
group by 0.11 in that quarter. This is a comparable effect to the effect shown in our
spatiotemporal variables, but appears to be an average of the effect over space and time. A major
contribution of this paper is that it allows for a much more detailed view of the levels at which
neighbor effects work.

[ TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ]

Table 3 also performs another useful robustness check. Columns 4 and 5 show the results of a
Negative Binomial regression with comparable specification to our primary specifications in
Table 2, only with year dummy variables (the model did not converge with year-quarter dummy
variables or with block group fixed effects). As mentioned above in Section 5, the nonlinear
Negative Binomial model is a common approach to use with count data for the dependent
variable. It adds a structural assumption, but this structure may make sense if adoptions occur
according to a Negative Binomial distribution. The Negative Binomial model is preferred to the
other common nonlinear model used for count data, the Poisson model, when the mean of the
count variable is not equal to the variance, for a characteristic of the Poisson distribution is that
the mean is equal to the variance.
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In our data, the mean of our PV count variable is 0.04 and the variance is 0.07. This suggests that
a Negative Binomial model is preferable to a Poisson distribution. The results in columns 4 and 5
are largely consistent with those in our preferred linear specification. These results can be
viewed as confirmatory of our previous results, which we view as our preferred results due to the
ability to include additional fixed effects as controls for unobserved heterogeneity.33

7.

Conclusions

This paper studies the primary drivers influencing the diffusion of solar PV systems across time
and space. We use detailed data on PV systems in CT, along with built environment,
socioeconomic, demographic, and political affiliation data, to highlight the key drivers through
both a geospatial analysis and a panel data econometric analysis.
Our geospatial analysis reveals that the pattern of PV system diffusion does not simply follow
patterns of housing density or income, as might be expected. Indeed, the patterns we find
indicate that small and mid-sized centers of housing density are just as important—if not more
important—than larger centers as the main players for the diffusion of PV systems. Previous
literature suggests that the diffusion would be expected to emanate from larger centers, while we
find wave-like patterns of diffusion primarily from smaller and mid-sized centers. We speculate
that this pattern in CT is a result of the state’s jurisdictional and socioeconomic fragmentation,
current regulations affecting adoption in multi-family buildings, and the Solarize communitybased programs.
Our panel data analysis develops a new set of spatiotemporal variables that we have not
previously seen in the literature. These variables allow us to more carefully model the spatial and

33

Results from a Poisson model with block group fixed effects did converge, and also provided comparable results,
but with very weak statistical significance for nearly all coefficients, including the spatiotemporal ones.
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temporal aspects of the influence of neighboring installations on the decision to install, while still
retaining a panel data structure that allows us to address the primary confounders of any peer
effects or neighbor effects analysis: homophily, correlated unobservables, and simultaneity. We
consider the refined scale of our analysis as an important contribution.
We find evidence that the primary determinants of the patterns of diffusion of PV systems in CT
are spatial neighbor effects and built environment variables. The electricity price and existence
of a Solarize program also play an important role in influencing adoption. Our results indicate
that there are important spatial neighbor effects: adding one more adoption on average increases
the number of PV system adoptions in a block group per year-quarter by roughly 0.2 to 0.3 PV
systems. Over a year, this is roughly one additional system in a block group or 12-18 per town
when taken at the average number of block groups per town. Of course, CT is in the early stage
of adoption of PV systems, so this effect is capturing the early stage of a classic “S-shaped”
diffusion curve (Rogers, 1962). Eventually, nearly all rooftops suitable for PV systems have
already adopted and block groups in CT will become saturated. This is an important context to
keep in mind for extrapolating our results forward in time.
Our built environment empirical results align with our spatial analysis. We find that adoptions
are decreasing in housing density and the share of renter-occupied dwellings, corresponding to
our finding that large centers are less important for the diffusion of the new technology. We view
these results as consistent with the possibility of split incentives in multi-family and rental
properties (Bronin, 2012; Gillingham & Sweeney, 2012).
Besides providing fresh evidence on the nature of the diffusion process of an important
renewable energy technology, our results also have several policy and marketing implications for
CT and comparable settings. The demonstrated importance of spatial neighbor effects is
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undoubtedly useful for PV system marketers and policymakers interested in promoting PV
systems, for it suggests carefully considering measures to leverage such spatial neighbor effects.
Indeed, the community-based Solarize programs are designed to foster social interactions about
solar PV systems and have thus far appeared in our data to be quite successful in increasing PV
system adoption. Our results showing the pattern of adoption of PV systems are also relevant to
policymakers, for they underscores Bronin’s finding that split incentives are quite important in
hindering the adoption in many more populated communities in CT. Policies reducing regulatory
barriers for “shared solar” or “community-based solar” may allow for greater penetration of PV
systems in more densely populated and less wealthy communities.
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Figures

Figure 1. Total and additional adoptions PV Systems in CT over time.
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Figure 2. PV system density and Phase I and II Solarize CT towns in 2013.
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Figure 3. PV systems and median household income in Connecticut in 2013.
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Figure 4. Spatial distribution of PV system hot spots and cold spots using different
approaches. Panel A shows PV systems and housing density. Panel B Optimized Getis-Ord
(OGO) and Panel C shows Local Moran’s I (COA) results.

Figure 5. Using fishnetting to examine the pattern of adoption of PV systems between 2005
and 2013.
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Figure 6. Fishnetting reveals patterns in PV systems adoption and population over time.
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Figure 7. Selection of all neighbors since 2005 (left) and in previous 12 months (right).
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Tables
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Source
Count of new PV systems by
0.04
0.27
0
18
CEFIA (2013)
block group and quarter
Installed base
0.48
1.24
0
39
CEFIA (2013)
Average neighboring
0.02
0.25
0
17
Calculated
Installations, 0.5 Miles - 12
months
Average neighboring
0.02
0.24
0
15
Calculated
installations, 0.5 to 1 mile - 12
months
Additional number of new
0.17
1.59
0
91
Calculated
installations, 1 to 4 mile - 12
months
0.03
0.34
0
19.33
Calculated
Average Neighboring
Installations, 0.5 Miles 24months
0.03
0.35
0
18
Calculated
Average Neighboring
Installations, 0.5 to 1 mile - 24
months
Average Neighboring
0.28
2.31
0
108
Calculated
Installations, 1 to 4 mile - 24
months
Number of Housing Units
0.61
0.37
0.01
13.38
U.S. Census
(1,000s)
Housing Density (0.001s)
0.79
1.30
>0.01
28.91
Calculated
% of Renter-occupied Houses
32.03
27.82
0
100
U.S. Census
Median Household Income (tens
7.89
4.71
0.15
76.86
U.S. Census
of thousands of 2013 dollars)
% pop who are white
77.38
23.45
0
100
U.S. Census
% pop who are black
10.70
16.86
0
100
U.S. Census
% pop who are Asians
4.34
5.79
0
73.12
U.S. Census
Median Age
40.41
8.50
11.10
80
U.S. Census
0.10
0.30
0
1
U.S. Census
Median Age in Highest 5%
% democrats
37.70
13.73
0
75.23
CT SOTS
0.53
0.56
0
7.06
CT SOTS
% pop in minor parties
Electricity cost (Cent/kWh)
18.39
1.40
16.28
20.46
EIA (2013)
Dow Jones Level (1,000s)
116.46
17.02
77.58 152.86 FRED (2013)
% of Solarize CT PV Systems
0.43
6.30
0
100
CEFIA (2013)
Notes: all variables have 90,090 observations, where the observation is a block group-yearquarter.
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Table 2. Primary Specifications

Average
Neighbors within
0.5 Miles
Average
Neighbors 0.5 to 1
Mile
Average
Neighbors 1 to 4
Miles
Number of
Housing Units
(1,000s)
Housing Density
(0.001s)
% of Renteroccupied Houses
Median Household
Income ($10,000)
% pop who are
white
% pop who are
black
% pop who are
Asians
Median Age
Median Age in
Highest 5%
% democrats
% pop in minor
parties
Electricity cost
(Cent/kWh)
Dow Jones Level

Year-Quarter Dummies

Block Group FE &
Year-Quarter Dummies

12 Months

24 Months

12 Months

24 Months

0.18***

0.11***

0.17***

0.10***

Block Group-YearSemester FE
12
24
Months
Months
0.30***
0.16***

(0.0625)

(0.0380)

(0.0615)

(0.0369)

(0.0781)

(0.0462)

0.12***

0.069***

0.12***

0.071***

0.21***

0.097***

(0.0420)

(0.0235)

(0.0420)

(0.0233)

(0.0587)

(0.0284)

0.050***

0.042***

0.052***

0.043***

0.065***

0.056***

(0.0066)

(0.0042)

(0.0065)

(0.0042)

(0.0080)

(0.0048)

0.032***

0.030***

0.015**

0.014**

-0.022

-0.057

(0.0053)

(0.0052)

(0.0062)

(0.0060)

(0.0404)

(0.0545)

-0.0063*** -0.0059***
(0.0009)
(0.0008)
-0.00024*** 0.00021**
*
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
0.00074** 0.00067**
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
0.00017** 0.00014**
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
-0.000017 -0.000021
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
-0.00071*** 0.00073**
*
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
0.00029*
0.00029*
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
-0.0088*
-0.0076
(0.0047)
(0.0047)
-0.00013
-0.000100
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
-0.00060
0.000011
(0.0020)
(0.0019)
0.0056*** 0.0038***
(0.0013)
(0.0012)
-0.00024
-

-0.0088***
(0.0014)
0.00039**
*
(0.0001)
0.00041
(0.0005)
0.00013
(0.0001)
-0.00032**
(0.0001)

-0.0083***
(0.0014)
0.00038**
*
(0.0001)
0.00029
(0.0005)
0.000088
(0.0001)
-0.00034**
(0.0001)

0.0015
(0.0094)

0.0041
(0.0113)

0.000034

0.00042

(0.0006)
0.0033
(0.0061)
-0.00026
(0.0017)
0.00061
(0.0015)

(0.0007)
0.010
(0.0082)
-0.00090
(0.0019)
0.00090
(0.0014)

-0.000070

-0.00016

0.0063

0.0054

(0.0003)
0.00012
(0.0002)
-0.0093*
(0.0048)
0.00028
(0.0003)
0.0013
(0.0027)
0.0064***
(0.0014)
-0.000084

(0.0003)
0.00012
(0.0002)
-0.0082*
(0.0047)
0.00028
(0.0003)
0.0018
(0.0026)
0.0045***
(0.0013)
-0.00038**

(0.0065)
0.0031
(0.0021)
-0.073
(0.0578)
-0.00082
(0.0037)
0.0054
(0.0135)
-0.0044
(0.0050)
0.00025

(0.0066)
0.0023
(0.0024)
-0.0025
(0.0520)
-0.0014
(0.0041)
0.0052
(0.0188)
-0.0053
(0.0060)
0.00017
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(1,000s)

% of Solarize CT
PV Systems
Constant
R-squared
Observations

(0.0002)
0.0055***
(0.0013)
-0.088**
(0.0404)
0.34
90,090

0.00053**
*
(0.0002)
0.0061***
(0.0013)
-0.024
(0.0359)
0.37
90,090

(0.0002)
0.0051***
(0.0012)
-0.10**
(0.0412)
0.33
90,090

(0.0002)
0.0057***
(0.0013)
-0.038
(0.0368)
0.36
90,090

(0.0002)
-0.00068
(0.0008)
-0.041
(0.1751)
0.36
90,090

(0.0002)
0.00038
(0.0006)
0.025
(0.2099)
0.38
90,090

Notes: Dependent variable is the number of installations in a block group in a year-quarter. An observation is a block group-yearquarter. Standard errors clustered on block group in parentheses.* denotes p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.010.

Table 3. Robustness Checks
Block Group FE &
Year-Quarter Dummies
Installed
12 Months 24 Months
Base
Average
Neighbors
within 0.5 Miles
Average
Neighbors 0.5
and 1 Mile
Average
Neighbors
1 and 4 Miles
Cumulative
Installed Base
Number of
Housing Units
(1,000s)
Housing Density
(0.001s)
% of Renteroccupied Houses
Median
Household
Income ($10,000)
% pop who are
white
% pop who are
black
% pop who are
Asians

Negative Binomial
with Year Dummies
12 Months 24 Months

0.17***
(0.0615)

0.10***
(0.0369)

0.47***
0.1048

0.22***
(0.0677)

0.12***
(0.0420)

0.071***
(0.0233)

0.30***
(0.0983)

0.13**
(0.0608)

0.052***
(0.0065)

0.043***
(0.0042)

0.52***
(0.0224)

0.34***
(0.0135)

0.11***
(0.0088)
0.015**
(0.0062)

0.014**
(0.0060)

-0.038***
(0.0123)

0.86***
(0.1248)

0.83***
(0.1307)

-0.0088*** -0.0083***
(0.0014)
(0.0014)
0.00039** 0.00038**
*
*
(0.0001)
(0.0001)

0.017***
(0.0031)

-0.81***
(0.1894)

-0.97***
(0.2138)

0.00041
(0.0005)

-0.000056
0.0078*** 0.0076***
(0.0001)
(0.0022)
(0.0023)

0.00029
(0.0005)

-0.00025
(0.0006)

-0.017***
(0.0052)

0.014**
(0.0054)

0.00013
0.000088
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
-0.00032** -0.00034**
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
-0.000070
-0.00016
(0.0003)
(0.0003)

-0.00010
(0.0001)
0.00024*
(0.0001)
0.00027
(0.0003)

0.018***
(0.0059)
-0.0079
(0.0080)
-0.021**
(0.0088)

0.014**
(0.0064)
-0.014
(0.0086)
-0.027***
(0.0094)

99

0.00012
(0.0002)
-0.0093*
(0.0048)

0.00012
(0.0002)
-0.0082*
(0.0047)

0.00028
(0.0003)

0.00028
(0.0003)

% pop in minor
parties
Electricity cost
(Cent/kWh)

0.0013
(0.0027)
0.0064***
(0.0014)

0.0018
(0.0026)
0.0045***
(0.0013)

Dow Jones Level
(1,000s)

-0.000084
(0.0002)

-0.00038**
(0.0002)

% of Solarize CT
PV Systems

0.0051***
(0.0012)
-0.1038**
(0.0412)
0.34
90,090

0.0057***
(0.0013)
-0.0382
(0.0368)
0.37
90,090

Median Age
If Median Age in
Highest 5%
% democrats

Constant
R-squared
Observations

-0.00027
(0.0002)
-0.015**
(0.0065)
0.0012***
(0.0004)
-0.0071*
(0.0042)
0.00014
(0.0018)
0.0007***
(0.0003)
0.0069***
(0.0007)
0.13
(0.0644)*
0.23
90,090

0.012**
(0.0054)
-0.15
(0.01071)

0.0096*
(0.0056)
-0.10
(0.1098)

-0.00039
(0.0047)

-0.0013
(0.0050)

0.16**
(0.0376)
0.10***
(0.0147)

0.014***
(0.0403)
0.081***
(0.0153)

0.0084
(0.0013)

0.0091***
(0.0014)

-0.00031
(0.0030)
-9.08***
(0.6983)

0.031
(0.0026)
-8.19***
(0.7403)

90,090

90,090

Notes: Dependent variable is the number of installations in a block group in a year-quarter. An observation is a
block group-year-quarter. Standard errors clustered on block group in parentheses.* denotes p<0.10, **
p<0.05, and *** p<0.010.
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1. Introduction
Due to rising concerns related to global warming, national security, rising energy prices
and resource scarcity, scholars, policymakers and marketers in the energy sector have
turned their attention to encourage the adoption of residential and commercial renewable
energy technologies (RETs). In this context, the USA have devoted resources to
encourage the adoption of residential photovoltaic systems (PV systems). The choice of
this RET is not fortuitous. PV systems emit virtually zero CO2 when producing power,
marginal production costs are nearly zero, and they can be scaled down relatively easily,
operating as stand-alone systems (Guidolin and Mortarino, 2010). However, in many
regions of the USA and the world, PV systems remain relatively expansive, requiring
jurisdictions to create monetary incentives for adopters (Gillingham and Sweeney, 2012).
However, thanks to improved technology and rising energy prices, beginning 2012 PV
systems have achieved grid parity in several regions within the USA and abroad (Zaman
and Lockman, 2011). As this trend continues, policymakers will have to recognize that
even generous monetary incentives may not actually increase the adoption of PV
systems, and, consequently the transition towards a sustainable society. In the USA,
states have acknowledged the role that non-monetary drivers play in the adoption process
of PV systems. Several states have promoted programs with components aimed at
exploiting network interactions such as peer effects, which previous research have found
to influence positively the adoption of PV systems (e.g. Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012).
These programs are linked with the local characters of the jurisdictions where they take

place. Within a U.S. state, for example, the role of smaller jurisdictional subdivisions,
such as towns, increases as state programs try to exploit non-monetary incentives.
Additionally, because many times these programs are designed at state level, they may
not be capable of capturing local differences in the socioeconomic profiles of residents,
thus not unfolding their full potential. Recently, literature on the diffusion of PV systems
has highlighted the role of several socioeconomic and spatial drivers in the adoption
process of PV systems. Within this stream of research, Bollinger and Gillingham (2013)
were the first to the role of spatial peer effects, while controlling for other socioeconomic
characters, such as income. The two authors focused their study in California,
demonstrating that an additional PV system increases the adoption rate within each ZIPcode by 0.78%. Similarly, Richter (2013) found evidence of smaller, although
statistically significant, spatial peer effects within postal area codes in the United
Kingdom. Rode and Weber (2012) and Müller and Rode (2013) found evidences of
spatial peer effects at two different scales in Germany. The first two authors use an
epidemic diffusion model built around an artificial grid to test the existence of spatial
peer effects, income levels and housing density across Germany. Müller and Rode (2013)
focused on the town of Wiesbaden and its urban surroundings, using the actual Euclidean
distance between adoptions, as well as a set of socioeconomic variables to control for
additional adopters’ characteristics. Both these works identified the limit of spatial peer
effects at around 1-1.2 km. The generalization of this finding is partially disputed by
Graziano and Gillingham (2014). The two authors focused on the role that spatial peer

effects, built environment and income play on the diffusion of PV systems in
Connecticut. In their work, Graziano and Gillingham used a multi-ring spatiotemporal
buffer based on the location of PV systems to control for spatial peer effect. This
approach represents a novelty compared to the use of installed base, as in previous
literature. The two authors found that spatial peer effects positively affect the diffusion of
PV systems up to four miles and 24 months, although decreasing in magnitude over time
and space. In addition, they found that housing density and renter-occupied houses tend
to reduce the probability of adoption at block group level, while income appears to have
no effect. Because of these results, the two authors suggested that difference in results
between their work and the work of Rode and Weber (2012), and Müller and Rode
(2013) in spatial and socioeconomic differences among the three study areas.
In the present work, we focus on the different profiles of adopters within four towns in
Connecticut: East Hartford, Glastonbury, Hartford and Manchester. We draw from the
previous studies of Graziano and Gillingham (2014), and Bollinger and Gillingham
(2012) to understand the role of the jurisdictional and built environment in the adoption
of PV systems, through their effect on other socioeconomic drivers such as spatial peer
effects. Additionally, we seek to understand what degree of generalization can be reached
by analysts when studying with social and spatial drivers to adoption of PV systems. To
achieve this, we use partition our four towns in to block groups, and conduct a typology
analysis of the block groups with higher adoption rates of PV systems in 2013. We find
that the profile of the potential adopters changes between towns, with Hartford and

Glastonbury providing two quite interesting conflicting results in terms of area geography
and socioeconomic status. In addition, we use the area-wide profile to understand how
this matches the findings provided by panel and Cross-Sectional models based on
Graziano and Gillingham (2014), for which we use more refined density values. We find
that the built environment affects the diffusion of PV systems indirectly, as it limits the
temporal and distance extent of spatial peer effects.

1.1 Connecticut and the Four Towns
Connecticut represents an interesting study area for PV systems diffusion. As of 2012,
Connecticut has the third highest median household income in the USA (2012 $66,844),
about 30% higher than the national value (Census, 2013). Despite appearing quite
wealthy on aggregate, Connecticut has widespread income inequality, the third highest in
the USA according to its GINI index, and poverty, which affects 21% of its residents
(Census, 2012; Carstensen and Coghlan, 2013). These differences within the state are
backed by the current jurisdictional fragmentation: the state is divided in to 169 towns,
which retain wide powers in several regulatory matters. This fragmentation creates
jurisdictional barriers dividing bordering towns and making them extremely
socioeconomically varied. Relative to PV systems, Connecticut is currently investing
heavily in this RET, offering monetary incentives and programs such as Solarize CT,
conjugating monetary and social incentives (Graziano and Gillingham, 2014).
Connecticut has reached grid parity as of 2014, mostly thanks to the high electricity

prices in the state and the generous state incentives. The incentive programs are managed
at state-level, with incentive levels and typologies set equal for the state as a whole. Even
in the case of Solarize CT, towns have to apply to be part of the program. Further, even
Solarize CT acts similarly across various towns, despite great socioeconomic differences
among them. Along with differences in the socioeconomic profile of potential adopters,
Connecticut towns vary in terms of built environment. Residents of smaller towns reside
in single-family houses, whereas those of larger, and older, urban centers such as
Hartford or New haven live in multi-family buildings. Due to the statewide prohibition of
sub-metering and the lack of split-incentives to encourage the adoption in these areas,
even in presence of higher income neighborhoods adoption of PV systems might be
difficult (Bronin, 2012). In aggregate, the state has seen a surge of PV systems adoption
in recent years. As of September 2013, 3,843 residents have adopted rooftop PV systems,
with an increase of 36.5% from December 2012 (CEFIA, 2013). However, given the
socioeconomic and structural differences within and between towns, current statewide
regulations and incentive programs might work below their potential because several
potential adopters are effectively cut out from the incentive schemes.
Within this context, our study area offers a wide range of socioeconomic conditions.
Figure 1 shows the extent and location of our four towns and the median household
income at town level.

[Figure 1 ABOUT HERE]

The towns play different role within the Connecticut’s economy. Hartford, the capital,
hosts several governmental buildings and it is one of the major international centers for
insurance companies. East Hartford still hosts few large manufacturing plants. Both these
towns have several problems related to poverty and crime. Manchester hosts one of the
largest shopping areas in the state. Finally, Glastonbury has recently developed as a
wealthier, sub-urban community, although it hosts several plots of farmland. Overall, the
four towns extend for about 300 sq. km of land, and is home to 268,000 people, or 7.5%
of the state population (Census, 2012), with Hartford being the third most populous in the
state.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we present a brief profile of the
four towns and the data sources, including drawing some concerns about current data
accessibility to scholars and policymakers. In section 3, we present the results of
hierarchical clustering analysis; and the profile of PV adopters within the study area and
within each town. In section 4, we present our panel and Cross-Sectional models. In
section 5, we present and discuss the results of the econometric analysis, providing a
comparison with the profile emerging from section 3. Finally, in section 6 we draw some
conclusion related to current generalization associated with PV systems diffusion and
policies.
2. Study Area and Data Sources
In the present study, we select four contiguous towns in central Connecticut: Hartford
(the state capital), East Hartford, Manchester and Glastonbury. All combined, these four

contiguous towns account for about 10% of the state population and 7% of the state land
surface, or 300 sq. km. We conduct our analysis at the block group level, selecting data at
this aereal unit when possible. Table 1 provides an overview of the sources used.

[Table 1 ABOUT HERE]
2.1 Socioeconomic Data
In the present study, we use the socioeconomic data prepared by Graziano and
Gillingham (2014). We selected the Block Groups belonging to Hartford, East Hartford,
Glastonbury and Manchester from their main dataset using ESRI’s ArcMap 10.2 and
STATA 12. These data are the result of interpolated values from actual observation
points derived from the Census 2000 and 2010 and the American Community Surveys
(ACS) – 5-year averages from 2005 to 2011 (Census, 2013b). The time period covered is
2005 through September 2013. In the interpolation process, Graziano and Gillingham
accounted for the changes in block group boundaries, using the newer boundaries
assigned by the U.S. Census after 2008.

2.2 PV Systems Data and Neighborhood Effect
Data about PV systems location and date of application to the CEFIA incentive program
come from the CEFIA Solar Database (CEFIA, 2013). The dataset contains several
information about adopters, including address of location and the day, month and year of
installation. The dataset records each residential installation since 2004. Because of the
methodology used, we dropped the (few) observation available for the first year. Overall,

the period considered runs from January 2005 and September 2013, equal to 9 years or 35
quarters
To understand the role of spatial peer effects, we build upon the work of Graziano and
Gillingham (2014), introducing the spatiotemporal variable developed by the two authors.
This variable aggregates at block group level the number of PV installations within 12
and 24 months from each actual PV system location at various spatial distances starting
0.5 miles. In the present work, we allow the search model to account for installations in
towns outside the study area. However, we change our specifications to account for the
different total extent of our study area, as explained in the model specifications.

2.3 Spatial Data and Issues with Parcels Data Collection
The majority of the spatial and boundary data employed assess the role of peer effect and
for display purposes come from the University of Connecticut Map and Geographic
Information Center (MAGIC, 2013). For understanding the role of the built environment,
we use the parcels data created by each of these towns. Compared to previous studies, we
do not use gross housing density (e.g. Graziano and Gillingham, 2014) or population
density (e.g. Rode and weber, 2012) for estimating differences in the urban setting and
the built environment. Rather, thanks to the more refined scale, we calculate the net
housing density. This density is expressed as:
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We recognize that using the actual living area footage would have been better. However,
data limitation, explained below in detail, do not allow for the use of that measure.
Despite this limitation, this density is acceptable given the urban setting of the study area.
Many of the parcels within these four towns have been developed pre-1970, and
dwellings tend to occupy almost the entirety of each parcel, with little space for yards.
Because of the data limitation, we adopt a gross housing density in our panel models.
This can be written as:
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A second measure controlling for the urban setting is the share of single-family houses
within each block group. We define this variable as follows:
"#" $
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In the paragraph above, we did not report a single source for the parcels data. Indeed,
Connecticut does not have a statewide or a region-wide depository of such data.
Consequently, each of the 169 towns is responsible for collecting, storing and sharing its
own parcels data. This extreme fragmentation is increased by a sub-fragmentation within
each town: several offices (usually two or three) are responsible for parts of the dataset,
and they seldom develop common fields in order to join the data in to a single dataset.
Additionally, even when towns have their datasets displayed online in built-in GIS
webpages, they either do not know how or are unwilling to make data available for

research purposes, or, even worse, do not know how to get the underlying dataset, which
have been contracted out to private companies. Finally, no attempt has ever being made
to standardize the quality, amount and recording procedures of the datasets. As an
example, few towns consider the ‘living area’ the actual livable square footage, whereas
others only measure the external size of a dwelling. Additionally, the dataset rarely
coincide with the official town borders, and several towns claim as theirs parcels
belonging to other towns according to the U.S. Census Bureau.
This situation rises concerns about the ability of towns and the state to take informed
decisions, especially when it comes to projects involving more than one town, such as
planning a new transportation corridor or a hospital servicing multiple towns.

3. Typifying Selected Towns
In our analysis, we focus on four towns in the central area of Connecticut: Hartford, the
state capital, East Hartford, Glastonbury, and Manchester. All these towns are relatively
old by U.S. standards, some having being founded as early as the XVI century. The
towns form an interrelated space within the Hartford Metropolitan Statistical Area, and
have strong economic ties. Nevertheless, each town is administered independently, and,
even though they all enjoy the same statewide incentives, they regulate the processes
through which PV systems can be licensed. In the present work, we analyze the
socioeconomic and the spatial differences among these towns. We find that these
differences affect the profile of adopters among these towns. Consequently, statewide

policies and current limitations in terms of sub-metering and slit incentives curb the
overall limit the efficiencies of the state’s incentives.

3.1 Typology Analysis and Residential Spatial Barriers
To capture the differences within and among towns, we use two methodologies. First, we
use hierarchical clustering to assess the number of clusters within each town, and the
major breakdown components (Kaufman, 2009). We display these results in dendograms
(in appendix A). From this analysis, we infer that that the optimal number of clusters is
four, with income being the major element determining the dataset partition. In the
following section, we will use these results to create and compare adopters’ profiles
across the four towns. As a first step, we analyze the presence of spatial gaps within
residential areas. These gaps reduce and cluster the strength of spatial peer effects.
Recent literature on PV systems diffusion have greatly highlighted the positive influence
that these effects have on adoption (e.g. see Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012). However,
in urban environments these effects may be reduced in presence of large portions of land
occupied by non-residential parcels. Once aggregated at block group, or tract level, these
effects will influence the overall adoption. Understanding the extent of these spatial gaps
provides a better understanding of the built environment within which policies and
adopters interact with each other.

In Figure 2, we show the four towns, highlighting the residential parcels over all other
town parcels. It appears quite clear that the four towns have quite different traits in terms
of residential distribution within their boundaries.

[Figure 2 About Here]

Starting with Hartford, we can easily identify gap in the eastern part of the town, where
very few residential parcels are located. This area coincides with the business district
servicing both Hartford and the other surrounding towns, and hosts several headquarters
of large multinational corporations (mostly insurance companies), as well as
governmental buildings. The few residents of this area live in multifamily buildings,
which are already penalized by the current policies (or lack of) regulating submetering in
Connecticut (Bronin, 2012). Looking at the distribution of the (few) PV systems, we
notice that six out of nine of the installations appear concentrated in distinct
neighborhoods. Moving towards East Hartford, we notice that the town is almost a
reversed copy of Hartford, in that the western portion is mostly non-residential. East
Hartford has several spatial gaps represented by manufacturing plants. The larger plants,
owned by Pratt and Whitney, a UTC subsidiary, has provided jobs for East Hartford
residents for several years. This plant separate the town in to three residential areas. To
the north, we find few adopters, spatially separated one from the other. In the center,
adopters are closer, with an outlier laying in between two large non-residential areas.

Finally, the southern portion, towards Glastonbury, becomes more densely populated and
PV systems are closer to each other. Moving to Glastonbury, one can notice that the
northern portion of this town hosts several closely built installations, and it is continuous
with the dwellings in East Hartford. The town develops further south, and it articulates in
to several neighborhood relatively contiguous, with several installations very close to
each other, although the distance increases in the southern portion of the town. Finally,
Manchester offers an interesting case of old town that has recently undergone a
suburbanization process. Founded in the late XVI century, Manchester became one of the
main industrial centers in the USA, hosting several mills and mechanical companies
(MHS, 2013). After a period of decline following the closure of many companies, the
town now hosts one of the largest shopping areas in Connecticut (‘Mall Area’ in Figure
2). The original structure is still visible in the central-eastern portion of the settlement,
delimited by the mall and other non-residential parcels. In this context, PV systems are
concentrated within specific neighborhood. The clusters of PV systems are quite visible,
suggesting that those areas have characteristics that encourage adoption.
Overall, the towns display several spatial gaps in their residential patterns. It is significant
that the nature of these gaps changes. For example, parks and green spaces can be easily
access and can provide places of aggregation. Effectively, spatial peer effects appear to
be concentrated within neighborhoods, depending on the layout of each town.
Consequently, programs partly based on community incentives will have to target several
neighborhoods within each town, rather than treating these towns as uniform entities.

3.2 Profiling Adopters
We employ to scales for comparing the profile of adopters. First, the characteristics, both
socioeconomic and related to the built environment, of the block groups within these
towns. Second, whether or not these characteristics are common across the study area.
Table 2 presents summarizes the profile of the adopters for each town and the one for the
region as a whole.34
[Table 2 About Here]
The description of the average adopter within the study area could sound like the
following: “a high-income, white home-owner, around 45 years of age living in a newly
built, large house in the outskirt of the towns. For each of these characteristics we can
find an exception when looking at the profile within each town. In particular, income and
race appear to vary across the towns. In Table 3, we present the same data in a different
way: we present each characteristic compared to the average for the study area,
displaying the actual value of reference and the ranking within each town’s groups.
[Table 3 About Here]
Comparing the towns provides a different perspective about the profile and distribution of
PV systems. Overall, the rate of adoption35 (PV rate) is far higher in Glastonbury than in
all other towns. However, most of these installations are contained within one block
group, which display a value several times higher than the average for the area
geography. The consequence of this difference is that while in Glastonbury adoption
34
35

See Appendix B for full tables.
PV systems installed as of September 2013/Residential Parcels in 2013.

appears more diffused, East Hartford is at a different stage of PV systems penetration.
Income is another characteristic changing its relative value across the towns. Although
levels above $100,000 are displayed in three of the towns, adopters in Hartford appear to
reside in medium-low income areas. Further, the same income level places adopters at
different levels within each town. In Glastonbury, the same income level of East Hartford
belongs only to the second highest income brackets, whereas in Manchester, the top
earners make twice as much as East Hartford. Overall, a household income of around
$100,000 is expected to characterize the block groups where adopters reside. Additional
differences are evident in the racial profile of adopters. In Glastonbury, the adopters tend
to be described as residents of diverse neighborhood. In Hartford, the larger number of
adopters are in areas with the highest percentage of white people. However, the ‘diverse’
neighborhood in Glastonbury has twice as much the share of white people than the one in
Hartford.
3.3 Built Environment and Social Status
We turn out attention at the built environment. Following the findings of Bronin (2012),
and Graziano and Gillingham (2014), it appears that current policies in support of PV
systems in Connecticut tend to favor single-family, owner-occupied houses in lowdensity areas. The results from the study area as a whole seem to confirm these findings.
However, when looking each town, we find a great deal of variation among
characteristics such as housing density, size, tenure, age and housing type.

Within these characteristics, Hartford is an outlier compared to the other towns and the
study area as a whole, except in the age of the adopting houses. Adopters live in smaller
houses usually in areas with higher housing density and mixed housing types. These
characteristics are consistent with the layout of Hartford (Figure 2): residential parcels are
small and clustered together in several areas. Overall, the socioeconomic profile of
adopters across these towns appear to be quite different from the overall profile across the
study area. However, with the partial exception of Hartford, the area geography
characterizing the presence of adopters is consistent with the one of the study area, and
consistent with the findings of Graziano and Gillingham (2014). The higher adoption rate
in low-density and single house block groups, combined with the mixed results from
income confirm that additional elements influence the adoption patterns of PV systems.
Additionally, overall low adoption rates among the more densely built towns, supports
the finding of Bronin (2012) in that current policies favor adoption by owner-occupied,
single-family houses.

4. Quantifying Drivers and the role of the Built Environment: Models and
Specifications
The analysis of block groups’ characteristics has provided us with two main results. First,
we identified the general profile of PV adopters, or, more precisely, the profile of an
adopter block group. Second, we established that this profile changes across the towns,
and, in light of the state jurisdictional and socioeconomic fragmentation, current

statewide policies not capable of capturing these local nuances may result in an overall
lower efficiency or bias towards specific regions. In the present section, we build on the
previous work of Graziano and Gillingham (2014), and Bollinger and Gillingham (2013)
using panel fixed-effect and Cross-Sectional models.36 Our specifications can be stated
as:
PVcounti,t = α + Ni,t β + Bi,t γ + Di,t θ + µi + ψt + εi,t

(3)

where PVcounti,t is the number of new adoptions in block group i at time t; Ni,t is the
vector of spatiotemporal variables built by Graziano and Gillingham; Bi,t is the vector of
built environment variables; Di,t is a vector of socioeconomic and demographic variables;
µi are block group fixed effects; ψt are time dummy variables; and εi,t is a mean-zero error
term. Compared to the work of Graziano and Gillingham, we limit maximum extent of
the spatiotemporal variables to two miles. We choose a shorter cut-off distance to account
for the relative size of the study area: four miles would equal the diameter of the largest
of the towns (Glastonbury), thus extending the neighborhood effects to the whole town.
This approach is consistent with the rationale in the paper by the two authors: the area
geography and social characteristics vary compared to the analysis of the state as a
whole. Consequently, a variation in the magnitude and spatial peer effects is expected.
The vector Bi,t varies between the panel models and the Cross-Sectional models due to
data limitation. In the former, we include the ‘Gross Housing Density’, presented above,
to control for housing densities and, to a certain extent, housing type. In the Cross36

We use a fixed effects approach, as a Hausman test results allow us to reject the orthogonality
assumption of the
random effects model at 99% confidence level

Sectional models, we replace this control with the ‘Net Housing Density’. Further, we
introduce the share of single-family houses, thus actually controlling for the housing type.
Finally, both models include the share of owner-occupied houses. As a whole, these
variables control for the relationship between the built environment and current state
policies. We seek to understand whether current regulations on sub-metering and split
incentives would increase adoption of PV systems, as suggested by Bronin (2012).
Additional controls for this group are the average year houses were built (Cross-Sectional
models only) and share of houses with five or more bedrooms. The vector Di,t contains
the socioeconomic and demographic variables. The vector contains controls for median
income, racial and age profile for each block group, with controls similar to those of
Graziano and Gillingham. We include an additional income (dummy) control,
income100k. This variable serves to control if the level of $100,000 positively affect
adoption, as it appears from the towns’ profile. As usual for panel models, we use time
dummy to capture year-specific effects.

4.1 Models Selection
In the present work, we use several different specifications following the research of
Graziano and Gillingham (2014), Bollinger and Gillingham (2012). In line with the work
of these authors, we use a series of fixed-effect (FE) models to estimate spatial peer
effects and the other socioeconomic drivers. However, due to data limitations such as the
lack of consistent historic parcels data, we have to use a much larger time-gap (the year)

and to make use of time-invariant models, specifically OLS and zero-negative inflated
binomial. These second sets of models seeks to identify the influence of the area
geography at a more refined scale than the previous works. We are confident that as
historic parcels data will become available in the future, this work could be expanded to
account for changes in the area geography of places. Due to the limited number of
observations, we deem town-level analysis of little use, and, instead, focus on the study
area as a whole.

5. Results
5.1 Panel and Cross-Sectional Analysis
In the present work, we are interested in: (i) the parameter β, which controls for spatial
peer effects; (ii) the parameter γ, which would link the effect of current polices with
area geography and the adopter’s profile; and (iii) the parameter θ associated with
Income100k. Table 4 presents the results of our econometric analysis.
[Table 4 About Here]
Overall, our results are relatively consistent with previous literature: we identify spatial
peer effect in several of our specifications, and these fade as time and space increase.37
However, the controls associated with the adopter’s socioeconomic profile and the built
environment show less consistency across the various models. In Table 4, the first
column shows the result of the OLS specification with year dummies. Column two
37

We performed several additional runs, including quarter-level specifications and town-year FE. Results
are available in Appendix B

through four shows the results for the actual panel FE models. Each of these columns
uses a different set of spatiotemporal variables, leaving unchanged the other variables.
Column 2 uses the installed base as a control for spatial peer effect. This is the more
common control in works on PV diffusion (e.g. Rode and Weber, 2012), and provides a
comparison with the other spatiotemporal estimates. Column (3) and (4) shows the results
for our preferred panel specifications. The two models are identical except that in column
(3) the peer effects are limited to the PV systems installed up to 12 months before the
observation. Column (4) extends this temporal distance to 24 months, thus, potentially,
including a higher number of neighboring adoptions.
Our results suggest that spatial peer effects fade for distances greater than 1 mile and
when the temporal extent is increased to 24 months, and it is relatively constant even
when we perform additional tests (Appendix B). Only distances up to 1 mile are constant
in their prediction power, thus suggesting that spatial peer effects is relatively well
established up to that distance within one year from the adoption. This result suggests
that within the four towns, adopters are not influenced by changes in the urban landscape
after one year. Furthermore, within the 12 months-period (column 3), the influence
exerted by previous installations fades within a radius lower than the one previously
found by Graziano and Gillingham (2012). In light of the empirical findings of these two
authors, ad their comparison with previous works (e.g. Müller and Rode, 2013), these
results highlight the sensitivity of spatial peer effects to the geography of the study area.
In densely populated, although fragmented urban areas like the one analyzed in our work,

spatial and social interaction requires shorter distances than in suburban towns.
Additionally, the urban environment is more variegated, and new installations become
easily part of what agents perceive as ‘familiar’. The results from the variables on the
built environment are less conclusive. In our panel models, none of the variables
controlling for housing density or tenure are significant. Of all other socioeconomic and
demographic controls, specifications (3) and (4) are consistent in the negative impact
associated with higher share of self-defined black residents. This result needs to be
interpreted in light of the disproportionate number of low-income non-white population
in the Connecticut and in the USA (Carstensen and Coghlan, 2013; Li and Harris, 2008).
Finally, Median household income and the control for income above $100,000 are not
significant. Nevertheless, the indicator for the Dow Jones Industrial Average is positive
for specifications (3) and (4). Although uniform across all block groups, this variable has
the advantage of capturing the global influence the economic cycle exerts over the
adoption decision. Unsurprisingly, when the economy is in good health adoption
increases and for an additional 1,000 points in the Dow Jones average level, we would
expect 0.014 additional installations within each block group.
Because of collinearity issues, we are forced to introduce our refined density and housing
typology in Cross-Sectional models. We present these results in Table 5, and test those
over five different specifications: OLS (12 and 24 months bands, and installed base) and
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (12 and 24 months). The latter is used to account for the
evident excess zeroes in the independent variable. We prefer this model to a Zero-Inflated

Poisson because the mean of the count variable is not equal to its variance. In our data,
‘PVCount’ has variance 0.33 and mean 0.22.
[Table 5 About Here]
The Cross-Sectional models confirms the existence of spatial peer effects up to 1 mile,
although the results of the count models are relatively disappointing. The very low
numbers of non-zero values in the count variable may have contributed to this outcome,
in spite of the inflated zero values. Our preferred specification is presented in column (1).
Within these models, we are more interested in the effects of the built environment. We
find that the net housing density negatively affect adoption. The magnitude of this
parameter is relatively low because of the scale chosen. An additional house within one
square kilometer is a relatively small addition, especially in an urban environment of 300
sq. km. This result conforms to the findings of Graziano and Gillingham (2014), and it is
in line with the argument of Bronin (2012). It is true that single-family houses are not
significant: however, this result may be due to aggregation issues at block group level.
Income shows conflicting results. Median income appears to influence adoption
negatively. However, this effect is more than balanced once we control for earners above
$100,000 per year. This result suggests that income provides a socioeconomic level that
allows the decision to take place. Additionally, and in light of the work of Graziano and
Gillingham (2014), and our analysis on towns’ profiles, we argue that income is a more
complex variable. It interacts and defines the physical and social space of households,

thus affecting the adoption decision through the definition, for example, of the built
environment or the educational level.

To summarize, we find that spatial peer effect within our study area contribute positively
to the adoption process, although within a shorter time period (12 months) and a smaller
distance (1 mile). This first result is consistent with the findings of Graziano and
Gillingham (2014) and their consideration on differences across study areas and their
geography. This brings us to argue that the jurisdictional, social and spatial extent of the
study areas and its component may affect the analysis and the actual adoption process,
thus making a priori assumptions about the temporal and spatial extent of spatial peer
effects erroneous. In addition, this result raises questions about the ability of urban
environment to ‘absorb’ new elements of the urban landscape faster than mixed areas. In
terms of built environment, we find that only the net housing density affects adoption
negatively, although single-family ownership does not constitute a good predictor.
Finally, income does not provide any meaningful insight, except in our OLS
specifications. In those, its prediction power is split between the negative effect of
median household income, and the positive, strong effect that block groups with median
household income above $100,000 have on the adoption process.

6. Conclusions and Future Research: New Regionalism or Flexible Modelling?

In the present work, we study present different drivers and profiles associated with PV
systems adopters in four Connecticut towns. Comparing the results of the town and rea
profiles with those of the econometric models, we find that the role of income and the
built environment are greatly reduced in the latter. The differences in the adopter’s
neighborhood profiles among the towns and between the each town and the study area as
a whole suggests that policies promoting the adoption of PV systems should expand their
degree of flexibility to account for multi-family housing units. In addition, in towns with
large spatial gaps between residential areas, group-based programs like Solarize CT
should be replicated within each neighborhood, rather than at town level, thus
aggregating adopters from within the same spatial region. Finally, we found that spatial
peer effects last shorter within the urban environment of these four towns than what
previously found for Connecticut as a whole, suggesting that PV systems are absorb
faster within urban environments than in suburban areas (Graziano and Gillingham,
2014). Comparing our findings with those of other studies on spatial peer effects and
socioeconomic profile of PV adopters, we persistently find differences related to the built
environment, the jurisdictional fragmentation, and socioeconomic levels. We are not
suggesting a return to a strong regionalism, where no region is similar to another. Several
works have found sets of socioeconomic demographic and spatial elements that
encourage or reduce adoption of PV and other energy systems across various study areas.
However, we argue that the interaction among these elements does not always follow the
same pattern. In our work, a different interaction emerge between spatial peer effects and

the built environment, for the former are reduced in time. Therefore, policies will have to
allow adopters and marketers to operate within different spatial, socioeconomic and legal
framework, using tools such submetering, split-incentives or income-based monetary
incentive schemes.
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Figures

Figure 1 – Study Area with Median Household Income at town level, 2012

Figure 2 – Spatial Barriers and Adopters, 2013

Tables
Table 1. Summary Statistics and Sources

Number of new Adoptions

0.06

Std.
Dev.
0.29

Cumulative Installed Base

0.65

1.97

0.00

24.00 CEFIA (2013)

Average Neighbors
within 0.5 Mile (12 months)

0.11

0.71

0.00

11.33 Calculated

Average Neighbors 0.5 and 1 Mile
(12 months)

0.11

0.70

0.00

11.00 Calculated

Average Neighbors
1 and 2 Miles (12 moths)

0.23

1.39

0.00

23.00 Calculated

Average Neighbors
within 0.5 Mile (24 months)

0.44

2.54

0.00

30.00 Calculated

Average Neighbors 0.5 and 1 Mile
(24 months)

0.46

2.63

0.00

33.00 Calculated

Average Neighbors
1 and 2 Miles (24 months)

0.94

5.22

0.00

63.00 Calculated

Number of Housing Units
(1,000s)
% of Owner-occupied Houses

0.63

0.41

0.05

3.65 U.S Census

49.18

33.80

0.00

100.00 U.S Census

3.52

6.42

0.00

65.86 U.S Census

1541.59

2283.09

Variable

% of Houses >5 bedrooms
Gross Housing Density

Mean

Min

Max

Source

0.00

3.00 CEFIA (2013)

9.50 28908.94 Calculated

Median Household Income
($10,000)
If income >$100,000
Dow Jones Level (1,000)
% pop who are white
% pop who are black
% pop who are Asians
Median Age
If Median Age in Highest 5%

Net Housing Density

5.60

3.71

0.15

0.16
11.75
52.45
25.57
5.68
36.71
0.08

0.36
1.65
28.59
24.83
8.08
9.47
0.27

0.00
8.89
0.00
0.00
0.00
11.61
0.00

Cross-Sectional Variables
886.49
524.47

0.00

2753.67 Calculated

55.67

0.00

100.25 Calculated

Share of Single-Family Houses

Table 2. Adopters’ Profile, Towns and Study Area
Characteristic
East Hartford
Glastonbury
Income
Race
Home
Ownership
House Size
Housing Age
Residents Age
Housing Density
Housing Type

35.12

1.00
14.87
100.00
100.00
73.12
80.00
1.00

U.S Census
FRED (2013)
U.S Census
U.S Census
U.S Census
U.S Census
U.S Census

High income

Middle income

White

Diverse

Hartford
Middle-lower
income
White

Homeowner

Homeowner

Homeowner

Non-homeowner

Homeowner

Large houses
Recent houses
Relatively old
In sparsely
populated
neighborhood
Single family

Smaller houses
Old houses
Relatively young
In sparsely
populated
neighborhood
Single family

Large houses
Recent houses
Relatively old
In densely
populated
neighborhood
Mixed

Large houses
Old houses
Relatively old
In sparsely
populated
neighborhood
Single family

Large houses
Recent houses
Relatively old
In sparsely
populated
neighborhood
Single Family

Table 3. Adopters’ Characteristics – Relative Rankings
Characteristic*
East Hartford
Glastonbury
Overall Adoption (PV
Highest (3.79)
Higher (0.0026)
Rate)
Income (Mean)

25.57 U.S Census

Average ($110,000; II)

Highest ($110,000; III)

Manchester

Study Area

High income

High income

Diverse

White

Hartford

Manchester

Lowest (0.004)

Higher (0.028)

Lowest ($36,000;
III)

Higher
($245,000; I)

Diversity (% white)

Diverse (60%; I)

Uniform (79%, III)

Diverse (35%; I)

Moderately
Uniform (61%;
IV)

Home Ownership (%
owners)
House Size (% homes >
5 bedrooms)

Higher (78%, I)

Highest (80%, I)

Lowest (32%; III)

Higher (98%; I)

Lowest (22%; I)

Highest (2%, IV)

Average (5%, II)

Lower (12%; I)

Relatively old (1950; II
recent)

Relatively recent
(1970; oldest)
Highest (46; II
youngest)

Most Recent (1976,
II recent)
Lowest (37; II
youngest)
Highest (2325,
highest)

Oldest (1860;
oldest)
Lower (47;
oldest)
Lower (354;
lowest)
Mixed-Single
Family (97%;
Highest)

Housing Age (max)
Residents Age (median
age)
Housing Density (max
residential/sq.km)

Average (45; oldest)
Below average (636; II
lowest)

Housing Type (% single Single Family (91%;
lowest)
family houses)

Lowest (258; lowest)
Single Family (81%, II
lowest)

Mixed (40%; II
highest)

*Notes: Description is relative to whole area. Level and ranking of highest adopting group are shown in parentheses.

Table 4. Panel Models
Year
Dummies
12 Months
(1)
Average
Neighbors
within 0.5 Miles
Average
Neighbors 0.5 and
1 Mile
Average
Neighbors 1 and 2
Miles

Installed
Base
(2)

12 Months
(3)

24 Months
(4)

0.13***
(0.0117)

0.13***
(0.0396)

0.016
(0.0239)

0.13***
(0.0133)

0.13**
(0.0558)

0.016
(0.0178)

0.022***
(0.0072)

0.027
(0.0294)

0.018
(0.0134)

-0.045
(0.0358)

-0.072*
(0.0436)

0.076***
(0.0183)

Installed Base
Number of
Housing Units
(1,000s)

Block Group and Year FE

0.040***
(0.0138)

-0.049
(0.0358)

% of Owneroccupied Houses
% of Houses >5
bedrooms
Gross Housing
Density

0.00054**
(0.0002)

0.000054
(0.0008)

0.00073
(0.0005)

-0.00013
(0.0009)

0.00092
(0.0007)

-0.0051**
(0.0020)

-0.00038
(0.0014)

-0.0025
(0.0020)

-0.0000043*
(0.0000)

0.0000013
(0.0000)

0.000000066
(0.0000)

-0.0000039
(0.0000)

Median Household
Income ($10,000)
If income
>$100,000
Dow Jones Level
(1,000s)
% pop who are
white
% pop who are
black
% pop who are
Asians

-0.0041
-0.000024
-0.0052
0.0012
(0.0025)
(0.0081)
(0.0035)
(0.0070)
0.097***
0.029
0.014
0.0068
(0.0206)
(0.0451)
(0.0424)
(0.0504)
0.011
0.011*
0.014**
0.0065**
(0.0070)
(0.0058)
(0.0054)
(0.0026)
0.000087
0.0014**
-0.00037
0.00015
(0.0004)
(0.0006)
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
-0.00016
-0.00059
-0.0010**
-0.0011*
(0.0003)
(0.0006)
(0.0004)
(0.0006)
0.0010
0.0022
0.0022
0.00074
(0.0006)
(0.0015)
(0.0014)
(0.0016)
0.0019
0.00085
0.0049**
-0.00028
Median Age
(0.0014)
(0.0011)
(0.0019)
(0.0007)
If Median Age in
0.075***
0.026
0.0098
-0.030
Highest 5%
(0.0217)
(0.0484)
(0.0359)
(0.0415)
-0.23**
-0.13*
-0.19*
-0.15*
Constant
(0.1059)
(0.0753)
(0.0981)
(0.0884)
Year Dummies
Y
Y
Y
Y
R-squared
0.58
0.20
0.57
0.47
Observations
1845
1845
1845
1845
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of new installation in each block group
each year, * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.010
Table 5. Cross-Sectional Models
OLS
12
Months

24
Months

Installed Base 12 Months

Zero-Inflated Negative
Binomial
12 Months
24 Months
(4)
(5)

(1)
Average
Neighbors
within 0.5 Miles
Average
Neighbors 0.5 and
1 Mile
Average
Neighbors
1 and 2 Miles
Cumulative
Installed Base
Number of
Housing Units
(1,000s)
% of Owneroccupied Houses
% of Houses >5
bedrooms
Net Housing
Density (#
residential
parcels/sq.km of
residential parcels)
% of Single-family
parcels
Median Household
Income ($10,000)
If income
>$100,000
% pop who are
white
% pop who are
black
% pop who are
Asians
Median Age
If Median Age in
Highest 5%

(2)

(3)

0.13***
(0.0306)

0.047
(0.0456)

0.032
(0.1147)

0.027
(0.1251)

0.16***
(0.0289)

0.10**
(0.0496)

0.067
(0.1017)

0.025
(0.1355)

-0.024
(0.0170)

0.017
(0.0237)

-0.019
(0.0568)

-0.022
(0.0731)

0.11***
(0.0125)
0.031
(0.0379)

0.034
(0.0478)

0.023
(0.0500)

0.010
(0.5447)

0.070
(0.6994)

0.0027**
(0.0013)

0.0020
(0.0016)

0.00010
(0.0017)

-0.0029
(0.0236)

-0.0071
(0.0262)

-0.00035
(0.0024)

-0.0036
(0.0030)

-0.0074**
(0.0031)

-0.0038
(0.0187)

-0.0074
(0.0186)

0.00013** 0.00012*
(0.0001)
(0.0001)

0.000078
(0.0001)

-0.00013
(0.0006)

-0.000032
(0.0006)

-0.00032
(0.0010)
-0.027***
(0.0083)
0.32***
(0.0950)
0.00058
(0.0017)
-0.00071
(0.0016)
0.0020
(0.0029)
0.00074
(0.0031)
0.089
(0.0894)

0.0012
(0.0014)
-0.0045
(0.0110)
0.083
(0.1257)
0.0017
(0.0022)
-0.00020
(0.0021)
0.0028
(0.0038)
0.0061
(0.0040)
0.038
(0.1178)

0.00067
(0.0125)
-0.016
(0.0469)
0.52
(0.5956)
0.019
(0.0321)
0.020
(0.0333)
0.031
(0.0383)
0.015
(0.0349)
0.13
(0.6738)

0.0019
(0.0123)
-0.000077
(0.0442)
0.45
(0.5739)
0.022
(0.0339)
0.022
(0.0353)
0.033
(0.0371)
0.027
(0.0412)
-0.063
(0.7470)

0.000080
(0.0013)
-0.013
(0.0105)
0.21*
(0.1185)
0.00069
(0.0021)
-0.00079
(0.0020)
-0.00037
(0.0037)
0.0069*
(0.0038)
-0.070
(0.1126)

Constant
Inflated:
# New Adoptions
Constant
Lnalpha
Constant

0.088
(0.1866)

-0.091
(0.2336)

-0.38
(0.2442)

-2.50
(2.9598)

-3.00
(2.993)

-45.5
(18873.88)
23.8
(15705.55)

-44.9
(15448.52)
23.5
(12781.16)

-27.5
(656.27)

-20.0
(667.35)

0.72
0.55
0.50
R-squared
205
205
205
205
205
Observations
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of new installation in each block group
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.010

Appendix A
A1. East Hartford

A2. Glastonbury

A3. Hartford

A4. Manchester

Appendix B
B1. Town-Year Fixed Effect

Average
Neighbors
within 0.5 Miles
Average
Neighbors 0.5
and 1 Mile
Average
Neighbors
1 and 2 Miles
Number of
Housing Units
(1,000s)

Town-Year
FE

Block Group and
Quarter FE

12 Months

12 Months

Zero Negative
Binomial
Town-Year FE
12 Months

0.13***
(0.0426)

0.072***
(0.0069)

0.35**
(0.1595)

0.13**
(0.0537)

0.057***
(0.0091)

0.044
(0.1704)

0.027
(0.0259)

0.060***
(0.0049)

-0.036
(0.1056)

0.028
(0.0172)

0.010**
(0.0039)

0.71***
(0.2524)

0.00079**
(0.0003)

0.00018***
(0.0001)

0.019***
(0.0069)

0.0012
(0.0009)

0.00027
(0.0002)

0.0092
(0.0135)

-0.00000079
(0.0000)

-0.000000040
(0.0000)

0.000038
(0.0001)

Median
Household
Income ($10,000)

-0.0096
(0.0061)

-0.00090
(0.0006)

-0.026
(0.0316)

If income
>$100,000

0.089*
(0.0507)

0.0094
(0.0066)

0.30
(0.3684)

0.000047
(0.0002)

0.0015
(0.0142)

0.000098
(0.0001)

0.044***
(0.0159)

% of Owneroccupied Houses
% of Houses >5
bedrooms
Gross Housing
Density

Dow Jones Level
(1,000s)
% pop who are
white

0.00014
(0.0002)

% pop who are
black

0.0000080
(0.0001)

0.000013
(0.0001)

0.023
(0.0166)

% pop who are
Asians

0.0012*
(0.0006)

0.00027
(0.0002)

0.058***
(0.0186)

-0.00090*
(0.0005)

-0.000041
(0.0002)

-0.00017
(0.0191)

0.081**
(0.0365)

0.016***
(0.0059)

0.32
(0.3883)

Median Age
If Median Age in
Highest 5%

-0.014
6.15
0.021
(0.0226)
(532.7771)
(0.0271)
R-squared
0.39
0.54
7175
1845
Observations
5083
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of new installation in each block group
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.010
Constant

B2. Quarter and Year Level, No Dow Jones

Block and Quarter FE,

Block and Year FE,

12 Months

12 Months

Average Neighbors
within 0.5 Miles

0.072***
(0.0069)

0.13***
(0.0397)

Average Neighbors 0.5
and 1 Mile

0.057***
(0.0091)

0.13**
(0.0559)

Average Neighbors
1 and 2 Miles

0.060***
(0.0049)

0.027
(0.0295)

Number of Housing
Units (1,000s)

0.010**
(0.0039)

-0.043
(0.0358)

0.00018***
(0.0001)

0.00073
(0.0005)

% of Owner-occupied
Houses

0.00027
(0.0002)

-0.00047
(0.0014)

-0.000000040
(0.0000)

-0.00000012
(0.0000)

Median Household
Income ($10,000)

-0.00090
(0.0006)

-0.0050
(0.0035)

If income >$100,000

0.0094
(0.0066)

0.014
(0.0424)

% pop who are white

0.000098
(0.0001)

-0.00040
(0.0005)

% pop who are black

0.000013
(0.0001)

-0.0010**
(0.0004)

% pop who are Asian

0.00027
(0.0002)

0.0020
(0.0014)

-0.000041
(0.0002)

0.00083
(0.0011)

0.016***
(0.0059)

0.010
(0.0360)

-0.0085
(0.0096)

0.033
(0.0463)

Y

Y

0.39

0.57

% of Houses >5
bedrooms

Gross Housing Density

Median Age
If Median Age in
Highest 5%
Constant
Temporal
Dummies
R-squared

7175
1845
Observations
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of new installation in each block
group
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.010

Conclusions
In my dissertation, I have presented several result relevant to the current research on the
diffusion of DRETs and PV systems. The three works presented here provide new
answers to the questions outlined in the introduction, and represent useful findings for
policymakers and scholars. In relation to the overarching objectives, I propose a
temporally dynamic conceptual model capable of accounting for the role of organizations
as well as the one of area geography, thus expanding the notion of innovation through the
mere contribution of niches. I used two concepts within the model, the spatial
relationships between agents (in terms of spatial peer effects) and the interaction between
policies and area geography in the two empirical works on PV systems. In terms of
spatial patterns, PV systems in Connecticut appear to contradict previous literature: towns
with the largest populations are not the engine of the diffusion, which, instead, generates
in medium-sized towns with populations within Connecticut’s average. Further, my
empirical estimation demonstrates a strong relationship between adoption and the number
of nearby previously installed systems as well as built environment and policy variables.
The effect of nearby systems diminishes with distance and time, suggesting a spatial
neighbor effect conveyed through social interaction and visibility. Finally, I find that
socioeconomic and spatial differences among urban areas within the same jurisdiction
(Connecticut) can greatly affect the diffusion process, especially when policies aimed at
encouraging the adopting of PV systems do not account for these spatial and social
differences. Furthermore, in the four towns studied in the third chapter, I find that the

temporal extent of spatial peer effects is reduced in time and space. This result suggests
that the urban environment could easily absorb and reduce the novelty effect of an
additional installation, possibly because the landscape is already dominated by man-made
objects. Due to data limitation and the risk of including effects due to ‘green on green’
effects, my dissertation does not include the effect of tree cover over the adoption’s
decision. I recognize that this, like other sources of shadowing effects, could potentially
effect the diffusion of PV systems, especially in a highly forested region like
Connecticut. However, the use of fixed effects in the two empirical studies account for
the changes in land cover, without shifting the overall focus away from the stated
objectives with issues beyond the scope of the current work.
As a whole, my dissertation provides new insight in the interconnected role of space, time
and policies, and argues for the need of encouraging the adoption of PV systems through
policies capable of addressing the socioeconomic and spatial differences, particularly
within inner cities. Within the conceptual framework, these findings relate to the
interaction between agents and those between agents, institutional framework and area
geography. The existence of spatial peer effects, and enriched by the addition of time,
confirms the results from previous literature, and relates to the adopting agents. The
findings on built environment are more strictly related to the interactions between
policies and area geography. In Connecticut, the study area of my dissertation, this
interaction is regulated on the one hand by strong monetary and non-monetary incentives
to promote the diffusion of PV systems. However, the same set of relationships are

regulated through the current prohibition of submetering and the lack of split incentives,
which effectively limit the adoption to a sub-set of residents, mostly owners in areas with
lower housing densities. Beyond the specific findings, my dissertation argues for the need
of more empirical research to understand how the area geography, time and institutions
operate and affect the diffusion of PV systems and other DRETs.

